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Abstract
We study online learning in repeated first-price auctions with censored feedback, where a
bidder, only observing the winning bid at the end of each auction, learns to adaptively bid in
order to maximize her cumulative payoff. To achieve this goal, the bidder faces a challenging
dilemma: if she wins the bid–the only way to achieve positive payoffs–then she is not able to
observe the highest bid of the other bidders, which we assume is iid drawn from an unknown
distribution. This dilemma, despite being reminiscent of the exploration-exploitation trade-off
in contextual bandits, cannot directly be addressed by the existing UCB or Thompson sampling
algorithms in that literature, mainly because contrary to the standard bandits setting, when a
positive reward is obtained here, nothing about the environment can be learned.
In this paper, by exploiting the structural properties of first-price auctions, we develop the
first learning algorithm that achieves O(
√
T log2 T ) regret bound that is matched by an Ω(
√
T )
lower bound–and hence minimax optimal up to log factors–when the bidder’s private values are
stochastically generated. We do so by providing an algorithm on a general class of problems,
which we call monotone group contextual bandits, where the same O(
√
T log2 T ) regret bound is
established under stochastically generated contexts. Further, by a novel lower bound argument,
we characterize an Ω(T 2/3) lower bound for the case where the contexts are adversarially gen-
erated, thus highlighting the impact of the contexts generation mechanism on the fundamental
learning limit. Despite this, we further exploit the structure of first-price auctions and develop
a learning algorithm that operates sample-efficiently (and computationally efficiently) in the
presence of adversarially generated private values. We establish an O(
√
T log3 T ) regret bound
for this algorithm, hence providing a complete characterization of optimal learning guarantees
for this problem.
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1 Introduction
With the rapid proliferation of e-commerce, digital advertising has become the predominant mar-
keting channel across the industries: in 2019, businesses in US alone [Wag19] have spent more than
129 billion dollars–a number that has been fast growing and projected to increase–on digital ads,
surpassing for the first time the combined amount spent via traditional advertising channels (TV,
radio, and newspapers etc.), which falls short of 20 billion dollars. Situated in this background,
online auctions–a core component of digital advertising–have become the most economically im-
pactful element, both for publishers (entities that sell advertising spaces through auctions, a.k.a.
sellers) and for advertisers (entities that buy advertising spaces through auctions to advertise, a.k.a.
bidders): in practice, online advertising is implemented on platforms known as ad exchanges, where
the advertising spaces are typically sold through auctions between sellers and bidders.
In the past, due to its truthful nature (where bidding one’s true private value is a dominant
strategy), the second-price auction (also known as the Vickrey auction [Vic61]) was a popular
auction mechanism used on various platforms [LR00, Kle04, LRBPR07]. However, very recently
there has been an industry-wide shift from second-price auctions to first-price auctions, for a number
of reasons: enhanced transparency (where the seller no longer has the “last look” advantage), an
increased revenue of the seller (and the exchange) and finally, fairness [Ben18,Sle19]. To understand
the last point on fairness, note that a seller would sometimes sell an advertising slot on different
exchanges, and take the highest bid across the exchanges (this is also known as the header bidding).
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Consequently, under second-price auctions, it’s possible that a bidder who bids a lower price ends
up winning the final bid. For instance, when there are two exchanges and the two bids on the first
exchange are 3 and 5, while the two bids on the second exchange are 10 and 1. Then on the first
exchange, the second bidder would win the bid at 3 while on the second exchange, the first bidder
would win the bid at 1. Since 3 is larger than 1, when those two winning bidders get aggregated, the
second bidder from the first exchange would win the final bid, despite the fact that the first bidder
from the second exchange is willing to pay 10. Note that this problem would not have occured if
first-price auctions were used: the highest bid among all bidders would be the same as the highest
of the highest bids of all exchanges.
As a result of these advantages, several exchanges (e.g. AppNexus, Index Exchange and OpenX)
started to roll out first-price auctions in 2017 [Slu17], and Google Ad Manager (previously known as
Adx) completed its move to the first-price auctions at the end of 2019 [Dav19]. Of course, it also goes
without saying that first-price auctions have also been the norm in several more traditional settings,
including the mussels auctions [vSK+01] (see [Esp08] for more discussion). However, despite these
merits, this shift brings forth important challenges to bidders since the optimal bidding strategy in
first-price auctions is no longer truthful. This thus leads to an important and pressing question,
one that was absent in second-auctions prior to the shift: how should a bidder (adaptively) bid to
maxmize her cumulative payoffs when she needs to bid repeatedly facing a first-price auction?
Needless to say, the rich literature on auctions theory has studied several related aspects of
the problem. Broadly speaking, there are two major approaches that provide insights into bidding
strategies in auctions. The first (and also the more traditional) approach takes a game-theoretic view
of auctions assuming a Bayesian setup where the bidders have perfect or partial knowledge of each
other’s private valuations modeled as probability distributions. Proceeding from this standpoint,
the pure or mixed (Nash) equilibria that model rational and optimal outcomes of the auction can
be derived [Wil69, Mye81, RS81]. Despite the elegance offered by this approach, an important
shortcoming of this game-theoretic framework is that the participating bidders often do not have
an accurate modeling of one’s own value distributions. Consequently, these value distributions are
even more unlikely to be known to other bidders or the seller in practice [Wil85].
Motivated to mitigate this drawback, the second (and much more recent) approach is based on
online learning in repeated auctions, where the participants can learn their own or others’ value
distributions during a given time horizon. Under this framework, a flourshing line of literature
has been devoted to the second-price auction, mostly from the seller’s perspective who aims for an
optimal reserve price [MM14,CBGM14,RW19, ZC20]. There are also a few papers that take the
bidder’s perspective in the second-price auction [McA11,WPR16], where the bidder does not have
a perfect knowledge of her own valuations.
However, to date, the problem of learning to bid in repeated first-price auctions has not yet been
adequately addressed. An outstanding distinction–one that turns out to be a key challenge–in first-
price auctions is that a bidder needs to learn about the bids of other bidders, which is unnecessary
in second-price auctions as a result of the truthful nature. In this paper, we aim to fill in this gap
and make an attempt to establish the optimal bidding strategy which minimizes the bidder’s regret.
Specifically, we consider learning in repeated first-price auctions with censored feedback, where the
private values of the bidder may vary over time. The feedback is censored because we work with
the more realistic (and hence more challenging) setting where only the highest bid–the bid at which
the transaction takes place–can be observed at the end of each round: a bidder cannot observe
others’ bids when she is the winner on a given round. Further, the bidder is competing against a
strong oracle, one that knows the underlying distribution of the others’ highest bid and hence can
bid optimally at each time. In order for the bidder to learn from the history, we only assume that
the highest bids of others are stochastic and follow an unknown iid distribution.
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1.1 Key Challenge
The key challenge in this problem lies in censored feedback and its impact on the learning process: if
the bidder bids a good price that wins, then she would not learn anything about the others’ highest
bid. This is the curse of censored feedback, which presents an exploration-exploitation trade-off that
is distinct from and much more challenging than that of the standard contextual bandits (where
one still observes the outcome that contributes to learning the model for any action taken).
To further appreciate the difficulty of the problem, let’s start by thinking about how an explore-
then-commit algorithm, perhaps the first algorithm that comes to one’s mind after some thinking,
would perform. In an optimized explore-then-commit algorithm, the learner would first spend
O(T 2/3) rounds bidding 0 (the lowest possible bid), observe the highest bid each time and (hence
be able to) learn the underlying highest bid distribution to within an accuracy of O(T−1/3). The
regret incurred for this period is O(T 2/3), since it’s purely exploration and hence constant regret
per round. Now, equipped with the O(T−1/3) estimation accuracy of the highest bid distribution, in
the remaining O(T ) rounds, the bidder, by pure exploitation, will incur total regret O(T ·T−1/3) =
O(T 2/3). Hence, the total regret is O(T 2/3) (and a moment of thought reveals that the division at
O(T 2/3) is the best one can hope for the explore-then-commit style algorithm).
However, it is unclear as to whether one can do better than this simple algorithm (could O(T 2/3)
be a fundamental limit in the presence of censored feedback?). It is mainly because that this problem,
despite the fact that it can be easily formulated as a contextual bandits problem (when treating the
private values as contexts, bids as actions and payoffs are rewards) [BZ09,RZ10,GZ11,AHK+14,
ADL16], cannot be solved directly by any UCB-type [LCLS10,FCGS10,CLRS11,JBNW17,LLZ17]
or Thompson sampling algorithms [AG13a, AG13b, RVR14, RVR16, AAGZ17] therein to achieve
better regret bounds: the underlying estimation problem is fundamentally different from that of the
standard contextual bandits due to censored feedback. Consequently, obtaining optimal learning
algorithms in this setting has remained an open problem.
1.2 Our Contributions
Our contributions are threefold.
First, when the private values follow any iid distribution, we provide the first minimax optimal
(up to log factors) learning algorithm: it achieves O(
√
T log2 T ) regret (Theorem 1) and we provide
a matching lower bound of Ω(
√
T ) (Theorem 6). We do so by heavily exploiting the structural
properties of first-price auctions: 1) the optimal bid never decreases when the private value increases;
2) once we know the payoff under a certain bid, then irrespective of whether this bid wins or loses,
we know the payoff of any larger bid. Our main insight is that these two properties–simple as they
look–can be fruitfully exploited to yield optimal learning guarantees. In fact, to drive this point
home and to push the agenda further, we abstract out these two properties and consider a broader
class of problems–which we call monotone group contextual bandits–that contains first-price auctions
as a special case. Monotone group contextual bandits are a particular class of (non-parametric)
contextual bandits that crystallize the above two generalized properties regarding optimal actions
and reward feedback. For this class of problems, we give a learning algorithm and show that it
achieves O(
√
T log2 T ) regret (Theorem 3), for the case where the contexts follow an iid distribution.
Second, we study the fundamental limit of learning on monotone group contextual bandits, and
show that when the contexts are chosen adversarially, the worst-case regret is at least Ω(T 2/3). This
lower bound clarifies the importance of the contexts generation mechanism: without any statistical
regularity of the contexts, the problem is inherently more difficult. We obtain this lower bound via
a novel argument that delicately translates the underlying exploration-exploitation tradeoff to the
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hardness of the problem: if the average regret is small, then the learner has not explored enough
to distinguish among the alternatives, which in turn incurs a large average regret. Note that this
is different from the typical (Ω(
√
T )-type) lower bound arguments in the bandits literature, where
the learner’s inability of distinguishing the alternatives is independent of the final regret attained.
Third, perhaps even more suprisingly, we show that O˜(
√
T ) regret is achievable even when the
private values are chosen adversarially. That the private values can arrive arbitrarily–on top of
censored feedback–certainly makes obtaining an O˜(
√
T )-regret bound much more challenging: this
breaks a key link in the stochastic private sequence setting–a link that allows the two structural
(monotonicity) properties to be appropriately exploited–and hence renders inapplicable the previous
algorithm and the regret bound. But what really makes an O˜(
√
T )-regret bound unlikely–if not
outright hopeless–is the Ω(T 2/3) lower bound we have just established for monotone group contextual
bandits when the contexts (corresponding to private values) are chosen adversarially. Despite these
seemingly insurmountable hurdles, we further exploit a somewhat hidden correlation-among-rewards
property of first-price auctions–which is absent in a general monotone group contextual bandit–and
put it into productive use. Specifically, we recognize that bidding at a high price–despite being
uninformative for payoffs obtained under lower bids–does provide some partial feedback, as a result
of the underlying correlation. Building on this insight, we provide an interval-splitting scheme that
estimates the unknown highest bid distribution via a dynamic partition scheme: the CDF of the
distribution is estimated on an appropriately chosen set of partitioning intervals, where each interval
has a certain number of data samples falling into it that is just sufficient to estimate the probability
of that interval to required accuracy. Further, on top of the previous insights, we develop a master
algorithm which decouples the exploration and exploitation in an efficient way to help handle the
complicated dependence in sequential learning. Putting all these pieces together yields the learning
algorithm ML-IS-UCB (Algorithm 4), which achieves O(
√
T log3 T ) regret (Theorem 2) and is hence
minimax optimal (up to log factors) as a result of the Ω(
√
T ) lower bound given in Theorem 6.
1.3 Related Work
Modeling repeated auctions as bandits has a long history and has inspired a remarkable line of
work [BKRW04,DK09,BSS14,MM14,CBGM14,BKS15,MM15,WPR16,CD17,GJM19,RW19,ZC20]
that lies at the intersection between learning and auctions. In these works, the auctions are typically
modeled as multi-armed bandits without any contexts, where the competing oracle can only choose
a fixed action. At the same time, some works considered the censored feedback structure in different
auction settings. In [CBGM14], the seller can observe the second highest bid only if she sets a reserve
price below it in the second-price auction. In [WPR16], the bidder in the second-price auction can
update her private valuation of the good only when she makes the highest bid and gets the good.
In [ZC19,ZC20], the authors proposed a one-sided full-information structure in stochastic bandits
where there is an order relationship between actions and choosing an action reveals the rewards of
all larger actions, with applications in the second-price auction. Beyond the auction setting, the
multi-armed bandit problem with general feedback structures (also known as the partial monitoring
setting) was studied in [KNVM14, ACBDK15, ACBG+17], where the regret dependence on the
number of actions is determined by the independence number or the weak dominating number of
the feedback graph. For partial feedbacks in contextual bandits, we are aware of a work [CBGGG17]
which studied a one-sided full feedback structure under the setting of online convex optimization and
proved a Θ˜(T 2/3) bound on the minimax regret. In comparison, our definition of the monotone group
contextual bandit is a generalization of [ZC19] to the contextual setting, and also of [CBGGG17] to
the bandit setting–but equipped with more structures–where the regret can be improved to Θ˜(T 1/2)
for stochastic contexts.
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We also review some literature on censored observations. In dynamic pricing, a binary feedback
indicating whether an item is sold to a particular buyer was studied in [KL03,CBCP18], where they
derived the optimal regret using multi-armed bandits. In particular, their results imply that if only
a binary feedback is revealed in the first-price auction (i.e. whether the bidder wins or not), even
under an identical private value of the bidder over time the worst-case regret is at least Ω(T 2/3).
Consequently, this result–together with ours–indicates the crucial role of observing the winning bid,
for the lack of it would worsen the O˜(
√
T ) regret to Ω(T 2/3).
A non-binary feedback structure similar to ours occurs in the newsvendor problem with cen-
sored demand [HR09,BM13], where only the demand below the current level of supply is directly
observable. Under this stronger feedback structure, the above works obtained the optimal Θ˜(
√
T )
expected regret in the worst case. However, in addition to this setting being non-contextual, the
policies in the above works–built around the well-known online gradient descent algorithm in the
online convex optimization literature–made a crucial use of the special properties that their utility
function is convex and more importantly, that the cost function’s derivative is directly observable.
In contrast, in our first-price auction problem, the utility function can even be discontinuous and
the derivatives are not observable, hence rendering the algorithms and analyses from that literature
inapplicable.
There is one recent work [BGM+19] that studied learning in repeated first-price auctions with
binary feedback, where the bidder only knows whether she wins the bid or not and the correspond-
ing minimax regret is proved to be Θ˜(T 2/3). In comparison, our work shows that a Θ˜(
√
T ) regret is
achievable when the additional censored feedback of the winning bid is available, thereby completing
the picture of learning in repeated first-price auctions. Moreover, although [BGM+19] considered a
cross-learning contextual bandit structure that is similar in spirit to our monotone group contextual
bandit and allows for feedbacks across contexts, we highlight some differences between [BGM+19]
and our work. First, our monotone group contextual enjoys two additional monotone properties
described before, and leveraging this structure allows us to develop a novel algorithm that performs
efficient elimination, which ultimately improves the regret from O˜(T 2/3) (in the binary-value feed-
back case) to O˜(
√
T ) under stochastic contexts. Second, unlike [BGM+19] where the stochastic and
adversarial contexts settings exhibit no difference in regret under stochastic rewards, our work shows
an outstanding distinction between these two scenarios. Specifically, despite the aforementioned re-
gret improvement under the stochastic contexts, when the contexts are adversarial, we provide a
delicate lower bound argument to show that the Ω(T 2/3) regret for cross-learning contextual ban-
dits is not improvable even under a stronger one-sided censored feedback structure. Third, when
the private values are arbitrary/adversarial, a setting that is not amenable to either cross-learning
or monotone group contextual bandits, we identify and exploit additional structures in first-price
auctions to design an algorithm that achieves the optimal O˜(
√
T ) regret.
2 Problem Formulation
In this section, we consider the problem of online learning in repeated first-price auctions where only
the bid at which the transaction takes place is observed at each time. We start with a quick summary
in Section 2.1 of the notation used throughout the paper. We then provide a detailed description
of the problem setup in Section 2.2 and describe the main results of the paper in Section 2.3.
2.1 Notations
For a positive integer n, let [n] , {1, 2, · · · , n}. For a real number x ∈ R, let ⌈x⌉ be the smallest
integer no smaller than x. For a square-integrable random variable X, let E[X] and Var(X) be the
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expectation and variance of X, respectively. For any event A, let 1(A) be the indicator function of
A which is one if the event A occurs and zero otherwise. For probability measures P and Q defined
on the same probability space, let ‖P −Q‖TV = 12
∫ |dP −dQ| and DKL(P‖Q) = ∫ dP log dPdQ be the
total variation distance and the Kullback–Leibler (KL) divergence between P and Q, respectively.
We also adopt the standard asymptotic notations: for non-negative sequences {an} and {bn}, we
write an = O(bn) if lim supn→∞ an/bn < ∞, an = Ω(bn) if bn = O(an), and an = Θ(bn) if both
an = O(bn) and an = Ω(bn). We also adopt the notations O˜(·), Ω˜(·), Θ˜(·) to denote the respective
meanings above within multiplicative poly-logarithmic factors in n.
2.2 Problem Setup
We consider a stochastic setting of a repeated first-price auction with censored feedbacks. Specifi-
cally, we focus on a single bidder in a large population of bidders during a time horizon T . At the
beginning of each time t = 1, 2, · · · , T , the bidder sees a particular good and receives a private value
vt ∈ [0, 1] for this good. Based on her past observations of other bidders’ bids, the bidder bids a
price bt ∈ [0, 1] for this good, and also let mt ∈ [0, 1] be the maximum bid of all other bidders. The
outcome of the auction is as follows: if bt ≥ mt, the bidder gets the good and pays her bidding price
bt; if bt < mt, the bidder does not get the good and pays nothing
1. Consequently, the instantaneous
reward (or utility) of the bidder is
r(vt, bt;mt) = (vt − bt)1(bt ≥ mt). (1)
As for the feedback information structure, we assume that only the highest bid is revealed at the
end of time t, i.e. the bidder does not observe others’ highest bid mt if she wins and observes mt
if she loses. This can be viewed as an informational version of the winner’s curse [CCC71] where
the winner has less information to learn for the future, and the feedback available to the bidder at
time t is both 1(bt ≥ mt) and mt1(bt < mt). The above structure holds in a number of practical
first-price auctions where only the final transaction price is announced [Esp08].
Next we specify the assumptions on the maximum bids mt and private values vt. To model
the bids of other bidders, we assume that the maximum bids mt are iid random variables drawn
from an unknown cumulative distribution function (CDF) G(·), with G(x) = P(mt ≤ x). The main
rationale behind this assumption is that there is potentially a large population of bidders, and on
average their valuations and bidding strategies are static over time, and in particular, independent
of a single bidder’s private valuation. Moreover, the iid assumption makes the learning possible for
the bidder, so that in the sequel she can compete against a strong oracle who may make time-varying
bids. This assumption is also adopted in reality by many demand side platforms where stationarity
of data is assumed given a certain time window. There are two possible modelings for the private
values vt. One model is that the private values (vt)t∈[T ] are stochastic and iid drawn from some
unknown distribution F . A stronger model is that (vt)t∈[T ] is an adversarial sequence taking value
in [0, 1] which is chosen by an oblivious adversary, who may choose vt in an arbitrary way while
independent of the bids (bt,mt)t∈[T ], as the private values in practice are usually learned using other
sources of information and independently of the bidding process.
Based on the above assumptions, the expected reward of the bidder at time t is
R(vt, bt) = E[r(vt, bt;mt)] = (vt − bt)G(bt). (2)
1By a slight perturbation, we assume without loss of generality that the bids are never equal.
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The regret of the bidder is defined to be the difference in the cumulative rewards of the bidder’s
bidding strategy and the optimal bidding strategy which has the perfect knowledge of G(·), i.e.,
RT (π; v) =
T∑
t=1
(
max
b∈[0,1]
R(vt, b)−R(vt, bt)
)
, (3)
where π denotes the overall bidding policy, and v = (v1, · · · , vT ) is a given sequence of private values
received by the bidder. The objective of the bidder is to devise a bidding policy π which minimizes
the expected regret E[RT (π; v)] for a given sequence v of private values, subject to the censored
feedback structure. When v is stochastic, the expectation E[RT (π; v)] in the expected regret in (3)
is taken jointly over the randomness of both the bidding strategy π and v. In contrast, when the
private value sequence v is chosen adversarily, the bidder aims to achieve a uniformly small expected
regret E[RT (π; v)] regardless of v.
2.3 Main Results
Our first result shows that, under stochastic private values, an O˜(
√
T ) expected regret is attainable.
Theorem 1. Let v1, · · · , vT be iid drawn from any unknown distribution F . Then there exists a
bidding policy π (the MSE policy constructed in Section 3.2) satisfying
E[RT (π; v)] ≤ C
√
T log2 T,
where the expectation is taken jointly over the randomness of v and the policy π, and C > 0 is an
absolute constant independent of the time horizon T and the CDFs (F,G).
In fact, the regret bound in Theorem 1 is valid for a general class of monotone group contextual
bandit problems (cf. Definitions 1 and 2) including the first-price auctions. However, we also show
that if one is restricted to the larger family above, for non-stochastic value sequences the worst-case
regret is lower bounded by Ω(T 2/3) (cf. Theorem 4). Hence, we propose another bidding strategy
tailored specifically for the first-price auctions to achieve an O˜(
√
T ) regret (with a slightly worse
logarithmic factor) under adversarial private values.
Theorem 2. Let v1, · · · , vT be any value sequence in [0, 1] which may be chosen by an oblivious
adversary. Then there exists a bidding policy π (the ML-IS-UCB bidding policy in Section 4.2) with
E[RT (π; v)] ≤ C
√
T log3 T,
where the expectation is only taken with respect to the randomness of the policy π, and C > 0 is an
absolute constant independent of the time horizon T , the value sequence v and the unknown CDF
G.
To the best of the authors’ knowledge, the above theorems present the first O˜(
√
T ) regret bidding
strategies for general unknown CDF G in the first-price auction. The Ω(
√
T ) lower bound for the
regret is standard even under the full-information scenario where mt is always revealed at each time,
and for completeness we include the proof in Appendix B.
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3 Learning in Monotone Group Contextual Bandits
In this section, we formulate repeated first-price auctions as a particular type of bandits that has
special structures not investigated in the existing bandits literature, and show that the regret bound
of Theorem 1 is achievable for all such problems. Specifically, Section 3.1 motivates and presents
the defining characteristics of monotone group contextual bandits, which include the first-price
auctions as a special case. Subsequently in Section 3.2, we propose an online learning algorithm for
monotone group contextual bandits, called Monotone Successive Elimination (MSE), and show in
Section 3.3 that if the contexts are iid drawn from any unknown distribution, the expected regret
bound in Theorem 1 holds. Finally, in Section 3.4, we characterize the fundamental learning limits
in monotone group contextual bandits by presenting a worst-case Ω(T 2/3) regret lower bound.
3.1 Monotone Group Contextual Bandits
We build up to our principal object of study by first defining a group contextual bandit model.
Definition 1 (Group Contextual Bandits). A (finite) group contextual bandit consists of a finite
time horizon T ∈ N, a finite context space C, a finite action space A, and a joint reward distribution
P supported on RM×K with marginal distributions (Pc,a)c∈C,a∈A, not necessarily independent across
c and a. The mean rewards are (Rc,a)c∈C,a∈A.
1. Learning and Feedback Model. At each t ∈ [T ], the learner receives a context ct ∈ C and
chooses an action at ∈ A based on ct and the historical observations. Nature then draws a
reward vector rt = (rt,c,a)c∈C,a∈A
iid∼ P and reveals a non-empty subset of entries of rt.
2. Regret. Let π = (a1, a2, . . . , aT ) be the overall policy used by the learner, then the regret is:
RT (π) ,
T∑
t=1
(
max
a∈A
Rct,a −Rct,at
)
. (4)
3. Contexts Generation.When ct’s are iid drawn from an underlying distribution supported on
C, it is a group contextual bandits with stochastic contexts. When ct’s can be arbitrarily chosen,
and in particular, by an adversary who observes the history, then it is a group contextual bandit
with adversarial contexts.
Remark 1. The standard contextual bandit is a special case of the above defined group contextual
bandit: in the former only a single reward (one that corresponds to the selected action) is observed
at each t, while in the latter a set of rewards–including possibly those rewards corresponding to other
contexts and/or actions–are observed.
Equivalently, a group contextual bandit is also a collection of multi-armed bandits (each one
corresponding to a context c ∈ C) with possibly correlated rewards, where correlation can occur both
across arms and across the multi-armed bandits. Further, and importantly, one when selecting an
action in one multi-armed bandit, one could potentially observe rewards from other actions in this
bandit and/or the other bandits in this group.
For simplicity, we assume throughout the paper that P is supported on [0, 1]M×K so that all
rewards are between 0 and 1. Everything generalizes straightforwardly to any subGaussian distribu-
tion.
Remark 2. Let |C| = M, |A| = K. In the standard contextual bandit model (where only the
reward rt,ct,at of the chosen action at under the current context ct is observed), it is known that the
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minimax optimal regret is Θ(
√
MKT ), which is typically much greater than Θ˜(
√
T ) for large M
and K. However, surprisingly, for a subclass of group contextual bandits defined in Definition 2 (to
which first-price auctions belong), Θ˜(
√
T ) regret is in fact achievable: at a high level, this is because
one can intelligently exploit the additional feedback that is present in the structured set of rewards
revealed to the learner.
To motivate this subclass of group contextual bandits, we start by describing how learning in
first-price acutions is a special instance of learning in a group contextual bandit. First, we note that
the bids bt are the actions, and the private values vt are the contexts: let ct = vt and at = bt, then
the joint distribution P over the rewards (rt,c,a)c∈C,a∈A is given by:
rt,c,a = (c− a)1(mt ≤ a), ∀c ∈ C, a ∈ A,
where mt
iid∼ G is a common random variable shared among all contexts and actions. Further, the
mean rewards are Rc,a = (c − a)G(a), which takes the same form as in (3). The only remaining
issue is that the private values and bids come from the continuous space [0, 1], which we can deal
with by adopting the following quantization scheme:
C :=
{
1
M
,
2
M
, · · · , 1
}
, A :=
{
1
K
,
2
K
, · · · , 1
}
. (5)
Note that any policy πQ on this quantized problem naturally results in a policy in the original
(continuous-space) problem: when vt ∈ [0, 1] appears, first clip it to v˜t = min{v ∈ C : v ≥ vt}
and apply πQ to get the bid for time t. This instantly raises an important question: how much
performance degradation can this quantization cause? The answer is not much, as formalized by
the following lemma.
Lemma 1. Let πQ be the overall policy for the quantized first-auction problem and π be the induced
overall policy for the original problem. Let R˜T (π
Q, v) =
∑T
t=1 (maxb∈AR(v˜t, b)−R(v˜t, bt)) be the
regret of πQ in the quantized problem, where v˜t = min{v ∈ C : v ≥ vt}. Then:
RT (π, v) ≤ R˜T (πQ, v) +
(
2
M
+
1
K
)
T.
Finally, to fully specify a group contextual bandit, we need to characterize which subset of
rewards (rt,c,a)c∈C,a∈A are revealed to the learner at each t, which is the key distinguishing factor
here from a standard contextual bandit. To motivate the particular feedback structure that will be
useful for our purposes, let us start by considering two key properties of the first-price auctions.
First, recall that the bidder receives partial information 1(bt ≥ mt) andmt1(bt < mt) at the end
of time t. One logical consequence here is that all indicator functions 1(b ≥ mt) are also observable
for any b ≥ mt, and so are the instantaneous rewards r(v, b;mt) = (v− b)1(b ≥ mt) for all v ∈ [0, 1]
and b ≥ bt. In other words, a bid bt not only reveals the reward for this particular bid under
the value vt, but also reveals the rewards for all bids b ≥ bt and all values v. Consequently, this
observation allows the learner to observe a whole set of rewards corresponding to all other contexts
and all other actions that are larger.
Second, as a result of the specific form of the expected reward function (2), the optimal bid
b⋆(v) = argmaxb∈B R(v, b)–despite being an unknown function of the private value v due to the
unknown CDF G–is in fact monotone in v, as formalized by the following lemma.
Lemma 2. For each v ∈ V, let b⋆(v) = argmaxb∈AR(v, b) be the optimal bid under the private
value v ∈ [0, 1] (if there are multiple maximizers in the finite set A, we take the largest maximizer).
Then the mapping v 7→ b⋆(v) is non-decreasing.
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Lemma 2 simply states that, whenever the bidder has a higher valuation of an item, she is willing
to bid a higher price for it. In other words, although the optimal bids b⋆(v) are unknown in general,
a reliable lower bound of b⋆(v) translates to a reliable lower bound of b⋆(v′) for all v′ ≥ v.
Based on the above two monotone properties, we characterize a sub-class of group contextual
bandits as given in Definition 1.
Definition 2 (Monotone Group Contextual Bandits). A monotone group contextual bandit is a
group contextual bandit satisfying:
1. Monotone Optimal Action. Let a⋆(c) = argmaxa∈ARc,a be the optimal action under the
context c, then a⋆(c) ≤ a⋆(c′) as long as c ≤ c′;
2. Monotone Feedback. If the learner chooses an action at ∈ A at time t, then nature reveals
the random rewards (rt,c,a)c∈C,a≥at to the learner.
Note that in Definition 2, we assume an order relationship on both the contexts and the actions.
Clearly, by the previous observations, the first-price auctions belong to monotone group contextual
bandits. In the subsequent sections, we will show that an O(
√
T log2 T ) regret is attainable for all
monotone group contextual bandits when the contexts are stochastic.
3.2 The MSE Policy
In this section, we propose a Monotone Successive Elimination (MSE) learning algorithm for a
monotone group contextual bandit. Specifically, we maintain an active set of actions Ac ⊆ A
for each context c ∈ C indicating the set of candidate best actions under c, initialized to be the
entire action space A. At each time t ∈ [T ], the learner receives the context ct and chooses the
smallest action at ∈ Act : this action provides information for all other actions a ∈ Act thanks to
the monotone feedback structure. Then we update the empirical mean rewards of all context-action
pairs (c, a) ∈ C×A based on the revealed rewards (rt,c,a)c∈C,a≥at . Finally, we update the active sets
Ac based on the following rules:
1. Eliminate all actions which are smaller than the smallest action in Ac−1, with the convention
A0 = A (as before we assume that C = [M ],A = [K], with the natural ordering on integers);
2. Eliminate all probably suboptimal actions which perform much worse than the best action.
The first rule relies on the monotone optimal action property in Definition 2, as actions too small to
be optimal under context c− 1 are also too small to be optimal under a larger context c. This rule
ensures that the mapping c 7→ minAc is also non-decreasing, and therefore choosing the smallest
action in Ac contributes one fresh observation for the quality of all actions a ∈ Ac′ with larger
contexts c′ ≥ c, which is crucial to providing enough data samples for large contexts. The second
rule eliminates bad actions when sufficient evidence is present, and “much worse” is quantified in
the confidence bound in Equation (6). Note that since the very first action chosen will always be
the smallest action 1 irrespective of which context is drawn on t = 1, the quantity ntc,a will always
be positive for all t ≥ 1. The overall policy is displayed in Algorithm 1.
The next theorem summarizes the performance of MSE in monotone group contextual bandits.
Theorem 3. For any monotone group contextual bandit with c1, · · · , cT iid drawn from any unknown
distribution F , if γ ≥ 3 in MSE, then:
E[RT (π
MSE)] ≤ 2 + 4γ log(KMT )(1 + log T ) ·
√
T .
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Algorithm 1: Monotone Successive Elimination (MSE) Policy
Input: Time horizon T ; action set A = [K]; context set C = [M ]; tuning parameter γ > 0.
Output: A resulting policy π.
Initialization:
Ac = A for each c ∈ C ∪ {0};
All (mean, count) pairs (r¯0c,a, n
0
c,a) initialized to (0, 0) for each (c, a) ∈ C × A.
for t ∈ {1, 2, · · · , T} do
The learner receives the context ct ∈ C;
The learner chooses the smallest action at = minAct ;
The learner receives random rewards (rt,c,a)c∈C,a≥at ;
for c = 1, 2, . . . ,M do
for a = at, at + 1, . . . ,K do
r¯tc,a ←
nt−1c,a
nt−1c,a + 1
r¯t−1c,a +
rt,c,a
nt−1c,a + 1
, ntc,a ← nt−1c,a + 1.
end
end
for c = 1, 2, . . . ,M do
Update Ac ← {a ∈ Ac : a ≥ minAc−1};
Let r¯tc,max = maxa∈Ac r¯tc,a, and ntc,max be the corresponding count;
for a ∈ Ac do
Eliminate action a from Ac iff
r¯tc,a < r¯
t
c,max − γ log(KMT )
(
(ntc,a)
−1/2 + (ntc,max)
−1/2
)
. (6)
end
end
end
Theorem 3 shows that as long as the contexts are stochastic, MSE achieves an expected regret
of O(
√
T log2 T ): that the near-optimal O˜(
√
T ) regret is achievable for monotone group contextual
bandits shows the benefits brought forth by the monotone structures, which yield the much sharper
log(KM) dependence rather than the O(
√
KM) dependence under the standard bandit feedback.
We show that how Theorem 3 implies Theorem 1 for first-price auctions, while leaving the proof
of Theorem 3 to the next subsection. Let πMSE be the policy for the quantized first-price auction
using the quantization scheme given in (5), and let π be the induced policy (via clipping and as in
Lemma 1) for the original first-price auction. Since the private values vt are iid, the quantizations v˜t
are iid as well. Consequently, adopting the same notation as in Lemma 1, Theorem 3 immediately
leads to E[R˜T (π
MSE; v)] = O(
√
T log2 T ), since R˜T (π
MSE; v) is exactly the regret in the quantized
first-price auction problem (and hence corresponds to group contextual bandits’ regret as defined
in Definition 1) under the MSE policy. Therefore, taking M = K = ⌈√T ⌉, Lemma 1 implies that
E[RT (π; v)] ≤ E[R˜T (πMSE; v)] + 3
√
T ,
thereby leading to Theorem 1.
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3.3 Analysis of the MSE Policy
This section is devoted to the proof of Theorem 3. Define the following “good” event, which roughly
says all empirical rewards concentrate around their true means:
G :=
T⋂
t=1
⋂
c∈C
⋂
a∈A
{
(ntc,a)
1
2
∣∣r¯tc,a −Rc,a∣∣ ≤ γ log(KMT )} . (7)
Why is G a good event? Because of the following two reasons.
1. When G holds, each active setAc does not eliminate the optimal action a⋆(c) = argmaxa∈ARc,a
during the entire time horizon. As such, as the learning algorithm proceeds, progress towards
shrinking to optimal action sets is being made, since only bad actions are removed.
2. When G holds, each (c, a) is visited sufficiently many times during the entiere learning horizon
even though this context c has only infrequently appeared and/or this action a has seldomly
been selected. More specifically, the number of times (c, a) is visited by time t satisfies:
ntc,a ≥ 1 +
∑
2≤s≤t
1(cs ≤ c) (8)
for all actions a ∈ Ac which remain active at the end of time t.
Let’s quickly discuss why the above two properties are true. For the first property, note that ac-
tions are eliminated at two places: first, all actions in Ac that are less than minAc−1 are eliminated;
second, each action a in Ac is eliminated when r¯tc,a is smaller than r¯c,max by a large margin. From
the monotonicity condition, we know that a⋆(c+ 1) ≥ a⋆(c) ≥ minAc; consequently, if the optimal
action of Ac hasn’t been eliminated, then the first elimination rule cannot eliminate the optimal
action of Ac+1. Further, since A0 = A, the optimal action of A1 can never be eliminated by the first
elimination rule; hence, by induction, the first elimination rule never discards an optimal action for
any active action set Ac. Next, on the event G, we have:
∣∣r¯tc,a −Rc,a∣∣ ≤ (ntc,a)− 12γ log(KMT ) for
every a. As such, let a⋆t and a
max
t denote the true optimal action and the empirical optimal action.
We then have
r¯tc,a∗
t
≥ Rc,a⋆
t
− (ntc,a⋆
t
)−
1
2 γ log(KMT )
≥ Rc,amax
t
− (ntc,a⋆
t
)−
1
2 γ log(KMT )
≥ r¯tc,max − (ntc,max)−
1
2γ log(KMT )− (ntc,a⋆
t
)−
1
2 γ log(KMT )
= r¯tc,max − γ log(KMT )
(
(ntc,a⋆
t
)−1/2 + (ntc,max)
−1/2
)
.
Hence an optimal action can never be eliminated by this second rule either.
For the second property, note that the first elimination rule forces the map c 7→ minAc to be
non-decreasing in c ∈ C. Hence, whenever cs ≤ c at some time s ≤ t, the reward of the (c, a) pair
will be observed at time s for any action a ∈ Ac at the end of time t, for the action selected at s will
be the minimum action of Acs (and a of course is larger than this minimum action). In addition,
we always have a1 = 1, and therefore all action-context pairs can be observed at the first time step.
This gives the inequality (8). Of course, one can still observe the reward of the (c, a) pair at s even
if cs > c (and this is why it is a lower bound of n
t
c,a): this can happen if the minimum action of
Acs is less than a. However, as it turns out, just counting the number of times cs is no larger than
c already characterizes the fact that we have observed (c, a) sufficiently many times. The following
lemma formalizes this “sufficiently many times” intuition, which will be an important ingredient in
the proof of the final regret upper bound.
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Lemma 3. Let X1, · · · ,XT be iid real-valued random variables. Then
E
 T∑
t=2
1 + ∑
2≤s≤t−1
1(Xs ≤ Xt)
−1 ≤ (1 + log T )2.
Remark 3. Note that the above inequality holds regardless of the common distribution of X1, · · · ,XT .
Intuitively, this is because the quantity 1 +
∑
2≤s≤t−1 1(Xs ≤ Xt) will typically be linear in t as the
joint distribution of (X1, · · · ,Xt) is exchangeable.
The above discussion establishes that G is clearly a desirable event, one that (as it turns out)
contains all the necessary ingredients for the algorithm to have small regret. However, this good
event would be vacuous if it is unlikely to happen. Fortunately, as the next lemma indicates, this
is not the case and G occurs with high probability.
Lemma 4. For γ ≥ 3 we have P(G) ≥ 1− T−2.
Remark 4. The proof of Lemma 4 requires some caution. By construction, r¯tc,a is the empirical
average of the rewards and hence
r¯tc,a =
∑t
s=1 rs,c,a1(as ≤ a)∑t
s=1 1(as ≤ a)
.
However, since the action at may depend on the realization of the past rewards (rs,c,a)s<t, the
numerator is not a sum of independent random variables when conditioned on the denominator.
Consequently, the usual Hoeffding’s inequality (which would have routinely yielded the desired bound
under iid assumption) does not apply here for the concentration of r¯tc,a. As such, we develop an ap-
proach that utilizes self-normalized martingales to bypass this conditional dependency. See appendix
for the detailed proof.
We are now in a position to establish the upper bound for RT (π) as stated in Theorem 3.
Proof of Theorem 3. Conditioned on G, the action at, we have ∀t ≥ 2:
Rct,at ≥ r¯t−1ct,at −
γ log(KMT )√
nt−1ct,at
,
Rct,a⋆(ct) ≤ r¯t−1ct,a⋆(ct) +
γ log(KMT )√
nt−1ct,a⋆(ct)
.
Moreover, the fact that action at passes the test (6) under context ct at time t− 1 implies
r¯t−1ct,at ≥ r¯t−1ct,max − γ log(KMT )
(
(nt−1ct,at)
−1/2 + (nt−1ct,max)
−1/2
)
≥ r¯t−1ct,a⋆(ct) − 2γ log(KMT )
1 + ∑
2≤s≤t−1
1(cs ≤ ct)
−
1
2
,
where the last inequality is due to (8). Combining the above inequalities yields to
Rct,a⋆(ct) −Rct,at ≤ 4γ log(KMT )
1 + ∑
2≤s≤t−1
1(cs ≤ ct)
− 12 ,
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and therefore conditioning on G,
RT (π) ≤ 1 +
T∑
t=2
4γ log(KMT )
1 + ∑
2≤s≤t−1
1(cs ≤ ct)
− 12
≤ 1 + 4γ log(KMT ) ·
√√√√√T T∑
t=2
1 + ∑
2≤s≤t−1
1(cs ≤ ct)
−1, (9)
where the last inequality is due to the concavity of x 7→ √x. As a result, the claimed regret bound
in Theorem 3 follows from (9), Lemma 3, and the high probability result in Lemma 4.
3.4 Limitations and Lower Bounds
Recall that the crux of the proof of Theorem 3 is that with one-sided feedbacks, the small actions
chosen under small contexts provide full information of the large actions chosen under large contexts.
Therefore, the ideal scenario is that the contexts come in an increasing order, where each early action
made by MSE provides full feedbacks for later actions. In contrast, there also exists a worst scenario
where the contexts are decreasing over time, so the early actions are typically large and essentially
provide no information for later actions. Theorem 3 shows that, in the average scenario where the
contexts follow any iid distribution, an O˜(
√
T ) expected regret is possible leaving the dependence
on (K,M) logarithmic. However, the following result shows that, for the worst-case contexts, an
Ω(T 2/3) regret is unavoidable for general monotone group contextual bandits.
Theorem 4. For K ≥ 2M and T ≤M3, we have
inf
π
sup
P,{ct}t∈[T ]
E[RT (π)] ≥ c · T 2/3,
where the supremum is taken over all possible monotone group contextual bandits (cf. Definition
2) with reward distribution P and all possible context sequences (ct)t∈[T ], the infimum is taken over
all possible policies, and c > 0 is an absolute constant independent of (K,M,T ). In particular, the
reward distribution P may be chosen such that |Rc,a−Rc,a′ | ≤ |a−a′|/K and |Rc,a−Rc′,a| ≤ |c−c′|/M
for all c, c′ ∈ C, a, a′ ∈ A.
Theorem 4 shows that, if we only formulate the first-price auction as a monotone group contex-
tual bandit (even in the presence of the Lipschitz properties of the expected rewards in (2) on both
arguments), there is no hope to achieve an O˜(
√
T ) regret for the worst-case private values (note
that for the first-price auctions, one needs M,K = Ω˜(
√
T ) to achieve an O˜(
√
T ) total quantization
error). Therefore, additional structures in addition to the monotone feedback for the first-price
auction are still necessary, which is the main topic of the next section. Note that Theorem 4 is an
improvement of the lower bound in [BGM+19] where the same Ω(T 2/3) bound was proved under a
less informative bandit feedback among actions.
We use a Bayesian approach to prove Theorem 4: we will construct 2M reward distributions P ε
indexed by ε ∈ {±1}M , and show that under the uniform mixture of these reward distributions, no
single policy can incur an average regret smaller than Ω(T 2/3). The derivation of the above average
lower bound requires a delicate exploration-exploitation tradeoff: we show that if the average regret
is small, then the learner does not have enough exploration to distinguish among the components
of the mixture and in turn incurs a large average regret. Note that this is different from typical
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lower bounds in the bandit literature, where the inability of distinguishing among the components
(or multiple hypotheses) for the learner is independent of the final regret she attains.
Assume that M = T 1/3 and K = 2M , for fewer actions and contexts are always helpful for the
learner (without loss of generality we assume that M is an integer). Consider the following context
sequence: for m ∈ [M ], let Tm = [(m − 1)T/M + 1,mT/M ] be the m-th time block, and (ct)t∈[T ]
be a non-increasing context sequence with ct = M + 1 −m whenever t ∈ Tm. In other words, the
contexts are M for the first T/M time points, and then M − 1 for the next T/M time points, and
so on. For ε ∈ {±1}M , define the reward distribution P ε as follows:
P ε =
∏
c∈[M ]
∏
a∈[K]
P εc,a =
∏
c∈[M ]
∏
a∈[K]
Bern
(
Rεc,a
)
, (10)
where the mean rewards are given by
Rεc,a =
{
3
4 − |a+1/2−2c|2K if a 6= 2c− 1,
3
4 − εc+14K if a = 2c− 1.
Clearly the rewards are always between [0, 1], and the Lipschitz condition |Rεc,a−Rεc,a′ | ≤ |a−a′|/K
holds for all ε ∈ {±1}M . The reward distributions are chosen to satisfy the following properties:
1. For the reward distribution P ε with ε ∈ {±1}M , the best action under the context c ∈ [M ] is
ac,+ = 2c if εc = 1, and is ac,− = 2c − 1 if εc = −1. Moreover, the reward distributions of all
actions but ac,− = 2c− 1 are fixed and do not depend on ε;
2. For any ε ∈ {±1}M , choosing any non-optimal action (e.g. misspecification of each coordinate
εc) incurs an instantaneous regret at least 1/(4K);
3. For any ε ∈ {±1}M and context c ∈ [M ], choosing any action a < ac,− which tries to explore
for the future under the context c incurs an instantaneous regret at least (ac,− − a)/(2K),
which is proportional to the number of time blocks this actions foresees.
Next we consider a uniform mixture on the reward distributions:
P =
1
2M
∑
ε∈{±1}M
(P ε)⊗T ,
where (P ε)⊗t denotes the probability distribution of all observables up to time t under the reward
distribution P ε. Similarly, for each component m ∈ [M ] and t ∈ [T ], we define
P tm,+ =
1
2M−1
∑
ε∈{±1}M :εm=1
(P ε)⊗t, P tm,− =
1
2M−1
∑
ε∈{±1}M :εm=−1
(P ε)⊗t (11)
as the mixture distributions conditioning on εm = 1 and εm = −1, respectively. For any policy π,
we will prove two lower bounds on the worst-case regret RT , supP,{ct}t∈[T ] E[RT (π)] which together
lead to Theorem 4. First, by the third property of the reward distribution P ε,
RT = sup
P,{ct}t∈[T ]
E[RT (π)] ≥ EP [RT (π)] ≥
M∑
m=1
∑
t∈Tm
EP [(acm,− − at)+]
2K
, (12)
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where cm = M +1−m is the context during the time block Tm, and (x)+ , max{x, 0}. The second
lower bound of RT is more delicate. Using the second observation,
RT ≥
M∑
m=1
∑
t∈Tm
P t−1cm,+(at 6= acm,+) + P t−1cm,−(at 6= acm,−)
2
· 1
4K
(a)
≥ 1
8K
M∑
m=1
∑
t∈Tm
(1− ‖P t−1cm,+ − P t−1cm,−‖TV)
(b)
≥ 1
16K
M∑
m=1
∑
t∈Tm
exp
(
−DKL(P
t−1
cm,+‖P t−1cm,−) +DKL(P t−1cm,−‖P t−1cm,+)
2
)
(c)
≥ 1
16K
M∑
m=1
∑
t∈Tm
exp
− 1
2M
∑
ε∈{±1}M
DKL((P
ε)⊗(t−1)‖(P ε˜cm )⊗(t−1))
 , (13)
where (a) is due to Le Cam’s first lemma P (A)+Q(Ac) ≥ 1−‖P−Q‖TV, (b) follows from Lemma 11,
and (c) follows from the joint convexity of the KL divergence in both arguments and the definition
of the mixture in (11), where ε˜c is obtained from ε by flipping the c-th coordinate of ε. Note that
the distributions P ε and P ε˜
cm
only differ in the reward under the context cm ∈ [M ] and the action
acm,− = 2cm − 1, which is observable at time s < t if and only if as ≤ acm,− due to the one-sided
feedback structure. Hence,
DKL((P
ε)⊗(t−1)‖(P ε˜cm )⊗(t−1))
(d)
= DKL
(
Bern
(
3
4
− εcm + 1
4K
)∥∥∥∥Bern(34 − −εcm + 14K
)) t−1∑
s=1
E(P ε)⊗(t−1) [1(as ≤ acm,−)]
(e)
≤ 2
K2
 T
M
+
∑
s≤Tm−1
E(P ε)⊗(t−1) [1(as ≤ acm,−)]
 (14)
where (d) follows from the chain rule of the KL divergence, and (e) is due toDKL(Bern(p)‖Bern(q)) ≤
8(p− q)2 whenever p, q ∈ [1/4, 3/4]. Combining (13), (14) and the definition of the mixture P with
the fact that 2T/(K2M) = 1/2, we have
RT ≥ T
16
√
eKM
M∑
m=1
exp
− 2
K2
∑
m′<m
∑
s∈T
m′
EP [1(as ≤ acm,−)]
 . (15)
Finally, we show that any regret RT satisfying both the lower bounds (12) and (15) must be of
the order Ω(T 2/3). In fact, by the convexity of x 7→ exp(−x), the inequality (15) gives
RT ≥ T
16
√
eK
exp
− 2
K2M
M∑
m=1
∑
m′<m
∑
s∈T
m′
EP [1(as ≤ acm,−)]

=
T
16
√
eK
exp
− 2
K2M
M∑
m′=1
∑
s∈T
m′
∑
m>m′
EP [1(as ≤ acm,−)]
 . (16)
Since for any m′ ∈ [M ] and a ∈ [K], it holds that∑
m>m′
1(a ≤ acm,−) =
⌊
(ac
m′ ,− − a)+
2
⌋
≤ (acm′ ,− − a)+
2
,
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a combination of (12) and (16) gives the final inequality for RT :
RT ≥ T
16
√
eK
exp
(
− 2RT
KM
)
, (17)
where the target regret RT appears at both sides of the inequality (17). Roughly speaking, the
exponent 2RT /(KM) quantifies the level of exploration achieved by the policy π, and a small regret
RT indicates a poor exploration of the policy. Finally, plugging the choices of parameters (M,K)
into (17) we conclude that RT ≥ T 2/3/(32e), establishing Theorem 4.
3.5 Application of Monotone Group Contexutal Bandits to Inventory Control
We conclude the section with a quick discussion on how the monotone group bandits framework
can also be applied to other learning-with-censored-demand problems in operations management.
Specifically, we consider the perishable inventory control (without lead time) problem, which has
been studied by [HR09] (this is also known as the repeated newsvendor problem in the literature;
see [BM13]). [HR09] gave an (optimal) O˜(
√
T ) algorithm based on online gradient descent: it turns
out that, as mentioned in the introduction, the problem exhibits the elegant features that the cost
function is convex and that the gradient of the cost function is actually observable. As such, our
goal here is not to provide a better algorithm than that given by [HR09] (since it’s already optimal),
but rather, provide an alternative algorithm that is a spin-off from our general methodology to deal
with censored feedback, which relies on neither convexity nor observable gradient but also achieves
optimal performance.
We consider the standard formulation (as in [HR09,BM13]) where the cost at each time t can
be written as:
c(at) = hE[(at − dt)+] + pE[(dt − at)+], x+ = max(x, 0),
where the action at ∈ [0, 1] represents the inventory decision at time t (assumed to be bounded
and without loss of generality to lie in the unit interval), the demand dt is drawn iid from a fixed
underlying demand distribution (with non-negative and bounded support and hence without loss of
generality supported on the unit interval), and the expectation is taken with respect to the demand
distribution. In the cost function, h(at − dt)+ is the cost of unsold perishable inventory as they
must be discarded at the end of the time period and cannot accumulate to the next time period
(also known as overage cost in newsvendor problems), and p(dt − at)+ is the cost of lost sales as a
result of not meeting the demand (also known as underage cost in newsvendor problems). Here, h
can be thought of as per unit cost of producing the inventory while p can be thought of as the unit
price of the inventory.
In this problem, an important feature is that only censored demand is observed: at the end
of time t, only min(at, dt) is observed. In particular, if the ordered inventory amount is less than
demand, then the observable demand is at (rather than dt). Regret is then defined to be the
comparison between the learning algorithm’s performance with the optimal performance if the
demand were known over a time horizon T : RT =
∑T
t=1(c(at)−mina∈[0,1] c(a)).
Note that at each t, the realized cost is h(at − dt)+ + p(dt − at)+ and is in fact not observable,
because dt is not observable (and hence there is no way to calculate the lost sales). On the surface
level, it appears that we cannot apply our first-price auctions learning methodology here because
there, we at least always observe the reward each time (despite the censored feedback). However,
it turns out that minimizing the above cost (which is unobservable) is equivalent to maximizing a
particular (and natural) reward in this process, which is observable.
Specifically, since h(at − dt)+ + (pdt − pmin(at, dt)) = h(at − dt)+ + p(dt − at)+, and since pdt
is not influenced by the action at, the above cost-minimization problem is equivalent to the reward
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Algorithm 2: Monotone Successive Elimination for Inventory Control
Input: Time horizon T ; action set A = {1/√T , 2/√T , · · · , 1}; tuning parameter γ > 0.
Output: A resulting policy π.
Initialization:
All (mean, count) pairs (r¯0a, n
0
a) initialized to (0, 0) for each a ∈ A.
for t ∈ {1, 2, · · · , T} do
The learner chooses the largest action at = maxA;
The learner receives random rewards (rt,a)a≤at ;
for a = at, at − 1, . . . , 1 do
r¯ta ←
nt−1a
nt−1a + 1
r¯t−1a +
rt,a
nt−1a + 1
, nta ← nt−1a + 1.
end
Let r¯tmax = maxa∈A r¯ta, and ntmax be the corresponding count;
for a ∈ A do
Eliminate action a from A iff
r¯ta < r¯
t
max − γ log T
(
(nta)
−1/2 + (ntmax)
−1/2
)
.
end
end
maximization problem where the reward at time t is r(at) = pE[min(at, dt)] − hE[(at − dt)+].
Note that now the realized reward at t is then pmin(at, dt) − h(at − dt)+, which is observable.
Consequently, we next focus on solving this reward maximization problem.
We start by noting that by discretizing the original action space [0, 1] into a discrete action
set A = { 1√
T
, . . . , 1}, we obtain a monotone group contexutal bandit: it has a single context
(since the initial inventory at the beginning of each time period is always 0) and consequently the
monotone optimal action property (vacuously) holds. Further, when an action at is chosen and
hence the reward pmin(at, dt)− h(at − dt)+ is observed at time t, all the rewards corresponding to
a smaller action than at are also available: the reward corresponding to a (for a < at) is simply
pmin(a, dt) − h(a − dt)+, which is readily computable since min(at, dt) is observed. Consequently,
the monotone feedback property also holds (despite being in the opposite direction as defined in
Defintion 2).
As such, the MSE policy immediately yields the following inventory control algorithm, formally
given in Algorithm 2 and Theorem 3 immediately implies O˜(
√
T ) regret guarantee. In closing, we
point out again this is merely a demonstration of the applicability of the monotone group contextual
bandits framework (rather than an earnest attempt to study the inventory control problem in depth);
for a detailed study of inventory control problem, see also [AJ19,ZCS19].
4 Learning in First-price Auctions with Adversarial Private Values
We now consider the much more challenging problem of learning in first-price auctions where the
private values, instead of being iid as studied in the previous section, are arbitrary and chosen by an
oblivious adversary. Surprisingly, we show that an O˜(
√
T ) expected regret can still be achieved in
this setting by designing a learning algorithm, which we call Multi-level Interval-Splitting UCB (ML-
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IS-UCB), that matches this bound. This learning algorithm, in addition to leveraging the monotone
groups contextual bandit structures, also exploits the additional property–correlated rewards among
actions–that is unique in the current setup to further improve the learning performance and reduce
the regret. We provide a high-level sketch of the main idea and a baseline IS-UCB policy in Section
4.1, and detail the final ML-IS-UCB policy in Section 4.2. The ML-IS-UCB policy applies a delicate
decompling between the exploration and exploitation to handle the possible dependence, where the
full analysis is placed in Section 4.3.
4.1 Main Idea: Correlated Rewards and Interval Splitting
The lower bound in Theorem 4 shows that learning with adversarial private value sequences cannot
be handled purely using a generic monotone group contextual bandit structure. That is because,
at the generality of a generic monotone group contextual bandit, one only has monotonicity–both
actionwise and feedbackwise–at hand, and hence, choosing one action reveals either complete infor-
mation or no information about the mean reward of another action. However, as we shall see, the
rewards of different actions in first-price auctions are actually correlated, and therefore choosing an
action may reveal partial information of another action, even if no information would be revealed
under the monotone group contextual bandits feedback structure.
To highlight the main idea, we first recall the key insights of the MSE policy (specialized to
first-price auctions). Specifically, it makes use of the crucial fact that the outcome of bidding low
prices provides full information for the rewards of bidding high prices, and this one-sided feedback
structure helps to achieve regret that depends only logarithmically on the number of contexts and
actions (i.e. K and M). Mathematically, observing the partial information of mt as a result of
bidding bt gives perfect knowledge of 1(mt ≤ b) for any b ≥ bt; therefore, bidding bt contributes to
estimating the CDF G(b) (and hence the mean reward of bidding b) for all b ≥ bt. The drawback
of this one-sided feedback structure, however, is that since the observations corresponding to large
bids provides no help in estimating CDF at smaller bids, there may not be enough observations
available for estimating G(b) for small b. Consequently, this can lead to large regret, especially when
the value sequence is chosen adversarially to yield decreasing bt’s over time.
Despite this hurdle, which is insurmountable in a generic monotone group contextual bandit,
our key insight in this section is that bidding high prices in fact provides partial information for the
rewards of bidding low prices: for any two bids b1 and b2, the random reward (v − b1)1(m ≤ b1)
of bidding b1 is correlated with the random reward (v − b2)1(m ≤ b2) of bidding b2. Therefore the
former observation may help infer part of the latter, even if b1 > b2. We exploit this additional
structure in first-price auctions via the following interval splitting scheme.
4.1.1 A Novel Interval-Splitting Scheme
Since the only unknown in the reward R(v, b) in (2) is G(b) = P(mt ≤ b), we may reduce the
reward estimation problem to the estimation of G, or equivalently the complementary CDF (CCDF)
G¯(b) = P(mt > b). We do so via interval splitting: for b < b
′, we write
G¯(b) = P(b < mt ≤ b′) + P(mt > b′). (18)
Now comes the crucial insight in leveraging this probability decomposition in (18). On one hand,
since b′ > b, the second quantity P(mt > b′) can be estimated within more precision, as more
observations are available for b′ than b. On the other hand, although the number of samples for
estimating P(b < mt ≤ b′) is the same as that for estimating G¯(b) in the MSE policy, the target
probability to be estimated becomes smaller: P(b < mt ≤ b′) ≤ P(mt > b).
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How does a smaller target probability help? It helps because the estimation error is smaller
using the same number of samples (compared to a larger target probability). The intuition can best
be obtained from the example of coin-tossing. If a coin has a small bias p, then after tossing it n
times, the empirical mean estimate would deviate from the true bias by O(
√
p/n) on expectation,
since the variance of the empirical mean estimator is p/n. Consequently, all else equal, the smaller
the bias, the easier it is to obtain an accurate estimate. This observation, when properly applied in
our current setting, leads to the fact that the smaller P(b < mt ≤ b′) can be estimated accurately
even if not enough samples are available. As such, the decomposition (18) motivates us to estimate
these probabilities separately to achieve better accuracy: the second quantity corresponds to the
correlation in the rewards where information from more samples is provided, and the first quantity
has a smaller magnitude and therefore enjoys a smaller estimation error as well.
Taking one step further, the decomposition (18) can be extended over multiple intervals in a
dynamic way over time. Specifically, let Pt = {b1, . . . , bt} be the set of split points of the interval [0, 1]
at the end of time t. For the sake of this discussion, we assume the bt’s are distinct (duplicate bids can
be handled easily and will be covered by the final algorithm discussed in the next subsection). Let
bσ(1), . . . , bσ(t) be a permutation of b1, · · · , bt that is increasing. With the convention b0 = 0, bt+1 =
1, σ(0) = 0, σ(t + 1) = t + 1, it immediately follows that for any candidate bid b ∈ (bσ(s), bσ(s+1)]
with 0 ≤ s ≤ t, we have:
G¯(b) = P(b < mt ≤ bσ(s+1)) +
t∑
s′=s+1
P(bσ(s′) < mt ≤ bσ(s′+1)).
With this decomposition, we can estimate P(bσ(s′) < mt ≤ bσ(s′+1)) using the empirical frequency
computed from the past observations as follows (note thatmσ(ℓ) is only observed whenmσ(ℓ) > bσ(ℓ)):
P̂(bσ(s′) < mt ≤ bσ(s′+1)) =
1
s′
s′∑
ℓ=1
1(mσ(ℓ) > bσ(ℓ))1(bσ(s′) < mσ(ℓ) ≤ bσ(s′+1)).
Note that only the first s′ observations are used in the above estimate, for mσ(ℓ) with ℓ > s′ is
either outside the interval (bσ(s′), bσ(s′+1)] when it is observed, or with an unknown membership in
the interval (bσ(s′), bσ(s′+1)] when it is only known that mσ(ℓ) ≤ bσ(ℓ). Either way, these remaining
observations cannot contribute to the estimation of P(bσ(s′) < mt ≤ bσ(s′+1)). Glancing at this line
of reasoning, we see that the sample sizes in each partition are different and adaptively chosen based
on the previous bids. In particular, the reward of bidding b is estimated by combining the local
estimates with different sample sizes.
Finally, based on the estimated rewards, the bidder picks the bid bt+1 for the time t + 1, and
update the partition as Pt+1 = Pt ∪ {bt+1}. Repeating the previous estimation procedure on Pt+1
shows that, bidding a high price bt+1 provides partial information for a lower price b in the sense
that an additive component of G¯(b), i.e., G¯(bt+1), can now be estimated using one more observation.
4.1.2 A Baseline Policy
The above interval-splitting scheme provides an efficient way of using past samples to estimate the
CDF. We now integrate this estimation scheme into the bidding process to form an online learning
algorithm IS-UCB (Algorithm 3), explained in more detail below. This algorithm contains the main
ideas of the ultimate bidding policy, but it is subject to some dependence issues which will be solved
by a master algorithm in Section 4.2.
First, we quantize the action space into K = ⌈√T ⌉ evenly spaced grid points B = {b1, · · · , bK},
which divides [0, 1] into K small intervals (bj , bj+1], with bK+1 := 1. For each (bj, bj+1], we count
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Algorithm 3: Interval-Splitting Upper Confidence Bound (IS-UCB) Policy
Input: Time horizon T ; action set B = {b1, · · · , bK} with bi = (i− 1)/K and K = ⌈√T ⌉;
tuning parameter γ > 0.
Output: A resulting policy π.
Initialization: Empirical probabilities p̂0i ← 0 and empirical counts n0i ← 0 for all i ∈ [K].
for t ∈ {1, 2, · · · , T} do
The bidder receives vt ∈ [0, 1];
if t = 1 then
The bidder bids bt = b
1;
else
The bidder chooses the following bid:
bt = argmax
bi∈B
(vt − bi)
1− K∑
j=i
p̂t−1j + γ
√√√√ K∑
j=i
p̂t−1j
nt−1j
+
1
nt−1i
 . (19)
end
The bidder receives 1(bt ≥ mt) and mt1(bt < mt);
for i ∈ [K] do
if bt ≤ bi then
p̂ti ←
nt−1i
nt−1i + 1
p̂t−1i +
1(mt ∈ (bi, bi+1])
nt−1i + 1
, nti ← nt−1i + 1.
end
end
end
the number of past observations nj which contributes to estimating pj = P(b
j < mt ≤ bj+1)–these
are observations from the time steps s ≤ t where bs ≤ bj–and from there compute the corresponding
estimate p̂j accordingly. From these estimates, we can then easily recover the CDF: in particular,
Ĝ(bi) = 1−
K∑
j=i
p̂j. (20)
Now, at time t, when receiving vt, we would ideally like to pick a bid b
i in B to maximize the
expected reward R(vt, b
i) = (vt − bi)G(bi)–if we had known G(·). Of course, we do not know G(·),
and a readily available estimate comes from (20). However, despite the best efforts that went into
making that estimate efficient via the interval-splitting scheme, distilled wisdom from the bandits
literature would frown upon us if we had simply plug in Ĝ(bi) and pick a maximizing bi thereafter,
because to obtain a good estimate Ĝ, one must explore when bidding. That same distilled wisdom
would suggest that using an upper confidence bound of Ĝ–rather than Ĝ itself–could potentially be
a good way to achieve exploration. Indeed, using an upper bound of Ĝ implies a certain level of
optimism; it amounts to believing mt is more likely to be smaller than the current empirical estimate
would suggest, thereby inducing the bidder to bid lower than what would have been bidded had a
greedy selection under Ĝ been employed: If this belief turns out to be true, then the bidder gets
a larger reward; otherwise, the bidder gets a valuable sample of other bidders’ maximum bid that,
when efficiently utilized (as discussed before), produces a good estimate of G(·).
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As such, an immediate question–one that is key to all designs of UCB-based algorithms–naturally
arises: how should one choose the upper confidence bound in this non-parametric setting? Consider
the following ideal scenario where each p̂j is a normalized Binomial random variable nj p̂j ∼ B(nj, pj),
and the estimates p̂j for different j are negative associated which are motivated by the Multinomial
models [JDP83]. In the above scenario, we have
Var
 K∑
j=i
p̂j
 ≤ K∑
j=i
Var (p̂j) =
K∑
j=i
pj(1− pj)
nj
≤
K∑
j=i
pj
nj
.
Hence, the form of the upper confidence bound in (19) is valid with high probability by the Bernstein
inequality (cf. Lemma 12), with tuning parameter γ at most poly-logarithmic in T . Note that the
width of the above confidence bound is no larger than O((nt−1i )
−1/2) which is used in Algorithm 1, as
we always have a larger sample size nt−1j ≥ nt−1i for j ≥ i and
∑
j≥i p̂
t−1
j ≤ 1. Of course, we do not
know pj and hence use the empirical estimator p̂j in its replacement in the upper confidence bound.
One could show that, if the confidence bound (19) remains valid under the practical scenario, then
the standard UCB-type arguments show that the IS-UCB policy achieves an O˜(
√
T ) regret under
any adversarial contexts. We refer the interested readers to an earlier version of this work [HZW20]
for details.
However, the above ideal scenario does not hold, mainly for the reason that each estimator p̂j
is not a normalized Binomial random variable. Specifically, the estimator at time t is
p̂tj =
∑
s≤t 1(bs ≤ bj)1(ms ∈ (bj , bj+1])∑
s≤t 1(bs ≤ bj)
.
There is a dependence issue on the above estimator: conditioning on the bidder’s bids (b1, · · · , bt),
others’ highest bids (m1, · · · ,mt) are no longer mutually independent. In fact, the choice of bt in the
IS-UCB policy depends on the previous probability estimates, and thus bt depends on (ms)s<t. As
a result, we do not even have the unbiased property, i.e. E[p̂tj] 6= pj in general. This issue also arises
in Remark 4, where each individual estimate p̂tj can be handled using the theory of self-normalized
martingales. However, the martingale approach breaks down in the current scenario where we need
to handle the concentration property of the sum
∑
j≥i p̂
t
j, and it is highly challenging to establish
the “nearly independent” nature among p̂tj for different j.
To circumvent the dependence issue, we propose a master algorithm to force that each estimator
p̂tj be a normalized Binomial random variable. The high-level idea is that instead of using all past
observations up to time t for computation, the estimator p̂tj is computed by a subset of the history
Φ(t) ⊆ [t] with the key property that (ms)s∈Φ(t) are mutually independent conditioning on (bs)s∈Φ(t).
The details are presented in the following Section 4.2.
4.2 A Master Algorithm: The ML-IS-UCB Policy
In this section, we propose a master algorithm which is a multi-level version of the IS-UCB policy,
which we call the Multi-Level IS-UCB (ML-IS-UCB) policy. The fully-functional ML-IS-UCB policy
is presented in Algorithm 4, where the idea behind the master algorithm is taken from [Aue02].
In the ML-IS-UCB policy, we split the entire time horizon [T ] into L different levels Φ1(T ), · · · ,ΦL(T )
in a sequential manner, with L = ⌈log2 T ⌉. The time points at different levels form a partition of
[T ], and therefore for each time point t ∈ [T ], the sets Φℓ(t) = Φℓ(T ) ∩ [t] also form a partition
of the current history [t]. We will call the collection of others’ highest bids (mt)t∈Φℓ(T ) with time
points belonging to the ℓ-th level as level-ℓ observations. Heuristically, the level-ℓ observations are
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Algorithm 4: Multi-Level Interval-Splitting Upper Confidence Bound (ML-IS-UCB) Policy
Input: Time horizon T ; action set B = {b1, · · · , bK} with bi = (i− 1)/K and K = ⌈√T ⌉;
number of levels L = ⌈log2 T ⌉; tuning parameter γ > 0.
Output: A resulting policy π.
Initialization: Set T0 ← (L+ 1) · ⌈
√
T ⌉, and the bidder bids bt = b1 = 0 for all 1 ≤ t ≤ T0;
Initialize Φℓ(T0)← {ℓ · ⌈
√
T ⌉+ 1, · · · , (ℓ+ 1) · ⌈√T⌉} for each ℓ = 0, 1, 2, · · · , L;
Initialize p̂0i ← |Φ0(T0)|−1
∑
t∈Φ0(T0) 1(b
i < mt ≤ bi+1) for each i ∈ [K].
for t = T0 + 1, T0 + 2, · · · , T do
The bidder receives the private value vt ∈ [0, 1];
The bidder initializes p̂0i,t ← p̂0i for all i ∈ [K], and B0t ← [K];
for ℓ = 1, 2, · · · , L do
For all i ∈ [K], the bidder computes the number of observations for the action bi at
level ℓ:
nℓi,t ←
∑
s∈Φℓ(t−1)
1(bs ≤ bi). (21)
For all i ∈ Bℓ−1t , the bidder computes the following width wℓi,t of the action bi:
wℓi,t ← γ
√√√√log(LKT )∑
j≥i
p̂ℓ−1j,t
nℓj,t
+ log(LKT )
(
1
nℓi,t
+
5√
T
) . (22)
if there exists i ∈ Bℓ−1t such that wℓi,t > 2−ℓ then
The bidder bids bt = b
i for an arbitrary i ∈ Bℓ−1t with wℓi,t > 2−ℓ;
The bidder updates Φℓ(t)← Φℓ(t− 1) ∪ {t} and Φℓ′(t)← Φℓ′(t− 1) for all ℓ′ 6= ℓ;
Break.
else
For all i ∈ [K], the bidder computes the empirical probability of each interval:
p̂ℓi,t ←
1
nℓi,t
∑
s∈Φℓ(t−1)
1(bs ≤ bi)1(bi < ms ≤ bi+1); (23)
For all i ∈ Bℓ−1t , the bidder computes the average rewards at level ℓ:
r̂ℓi,t ← (vt − bi) ·
1−∑
j≥i
p̂ℓj,t
 ; (24)
Eliminate bad actions at level ℓ:
Bℓt ←
{
i ∈ Bℓ−1t : r̂ℓi,t + wℓi,t ≥ max
j∈Bℓ−1
t
(
r̂ℓj,t + w
ℓ
j,t
)
− 2 · 2−ℓ
}
. (25)
Continue.
end
end
The bidder receives 1(bt ≥ mt) and mt1(bt < mt);
end
24
responsible for the level-ℓ estimation of the rewards for each candidate action surviving through
this level, as well as a certificate stating whether the estimation accuracy for each candidate action
is within 2−ℓ or not. Specifically, at each time t ∈ [T ], we associate three objects to every level ℓ:
1. The certificate, or the width wℓi,t: The certificate is the first quantity to compute when entering
each level, which measures an estimate of the reward estimation accuracy of each candidate
action using the observations at the current level. Consequently, if wℓi,t is small for some action
i ∈ [K], then the bidder knows that the level-ℓ reward estimate of the action i is expected to
be accurate, even before the bidder knows what are the level-ℓ estimates. In other words, the
computation of the certificate does not depend on (ms)s∈Φℓ(T ).
Specifically, the certificate is set to be the width (i.e. the amount of optimism) of the upper
confidence bound in (19), with several slight modifications. First, the number of observations
nℓi,t for the i-th interval is counted only on past level-ℓ bids, as shown in (21). Second, the
probability estimate for each interval appearing in (19) (to estimate the variance) is chosen to
be the estimates p̂ℓ−1i,t outputted by the previous level ℓ−1. Third, some additional remainder
terms are added to the width mainly for technical purposes. The final expression of the width
wℓi,t for each candidate action is displayed in (22), and it is easy to see that the width does
not depend on the level-ℓ observations (ms)s∈Φℓ(T ).
2. The estimates p̂ℓi,t and r̂
ℓ
i,t: There are two possibilities after the certification step. If there
is a candidate action with width at least 2−ℓ, then the bidder stops here and chooses that
action (if there are multiple such actions choose an arbitrary one). Also, the bidder assigns
level ℓ to the time point t. The above scenario corresponds to an exploration step, where no
estimates are performed at level ℓ. Conversely, if all candidate actions have width smaller
than 2−ℓ, the bidder will perform the estimation and move to level ℓ + 1. Specifically, the
bidder computes the empirical probability of each interval using only level-ℓ observations (cf.
(23)), and consequently computes the reward estimates for each candidate action based on
the above empirical probabilities (cf. (24)). Note that if the certificates in the first step are
accurate, then both estimates are guaranteed to be O(2−ℓ)-close to the truth.
3. The candidate action set Bℓt : After the bidder computes the estimates, she makes the exploita-
tion step and eliminates probably bad actions from the candidates. Specifically, she updates
the candidate set from Bℓ−1t to Bℓt based on a UCB-type rule, which removes all actions whose
upper confidence bound r̂ℓi,t + w
ℓ
i,t is smaller than the best one by a margin of at least 2 · 2−ℓ
(cf. (25)). The choice of the margin ensures two important properties of the elimination rule.
First, the best action is never eliminated with high probability. Second, if any action in the
candidate set Bℓt is selected, the instantaneous regret is at most O(2−ℓ). After the update on
the candidate action set, the bidder moves to level ℓ+ 1 and repeat the above procedures.
In summary, instead of computing the reward estimates and the width simultaneously and using
the sum as the upper confidence bound in the previous IS-UCB algorithm, the ML-IS-UCB policy
decouples the certification phase and the estimation phase. Specifically, the widths are computed
first at each level without knowing the observations at that level, and the bidder performs estimation
and exploits a good action only if she is confident that the estimates she is about to carry out are
expected to be accurate (as quantified by the previous widths). Otherwise she explores and chooses
any action with a large width, hoping that the width of the selected action will shrink below the
desired level next time. This decoupling plays a key role in dealing with the dependence structure:
specifically, Lemma 5 in Section 4.3 shows that for each level ℓ, the level-ℓ observations (mt)t∈Φℓ(T )
are mutually independent conditioning on the level-ℓ bids (bt)t∈Φℓ(T ).
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We also discuss some other details of Algorithm 4. First, the bidder always bids zero in the first
T0 = O(
√
T log T ) rounds, and attributes the resulting observations evenly to L levels. This pure-
exploration step ensures that the number of observations at each level is at least
√
T , which helps
to ensure that all estimates have enough accuracy even at the beginning. Moreover, the above step
leads to a total regret at most O(
√
T log T ) and therefore does not increase the order of the total
regret. Second, we also define the level-0 observations only consisting of the first
√
T observations
where the bidder again consistently bids zero. These level-0 observations are used to form the initial
probability estimates involved in the computation of the level-1 certificates. Finally, we remark that
the loop in Algorithm 4 will break before ℓ = L, for (22) shows that wℓi,t ≥ 1/
√
T and therefore the
widths wℓi,t cannot be smaller than 2
−L ≤ 1/T .
We are next ready to characterize the learning performance of the ML-IS-UCB policy.
Theorem 5. Let the private values v1, · · · , vt ∈ [0, 1] be a sequence chosen by an oblivious adversary.
For γ ≥ 3, the regret of the ML-IS-UCB policy satisfies
E[R(πML-IS-UCB; v)] ≤ 4 + (L+ 4) · ⌈
√
T ⌉+ 80γ log(LKT )(1 + log T ) · L
√
T .
Plugging the choices of parameters K = ⌈√T ⌉ and L = ⌈log2 T ⌉, the claim of Theorem 5 implies
Theorem 2 and shows that an O˜(
√
T ) regret is achievable under any private values.
4.3 Analysis of the ML-IS-UCB Policy
This section is devoted to the proof of Theorem 5. The proof breaks into two parts. First, we show
that the width wℓi,t constructed in (22) is a reliable certificate for the estimates, i.e. |r̂ℓi,t−ri,t| ≤ wℓi,t
holds simultaneously for all i ∈ [K], t ∈ [T ], ℓ ∈ [L] with high probability. Hence, the instantaneous
regret at each time t ∈ Φℓ(T ) is at most O(2−ℓ). Second, we provide an upper bound of |Φℓ(T )| for
each ℓ = 1, 2, · · · , L, showing that the total regret of the ML-IS-UCB policy is at most O˜(√T ).
To start with, we first show the following result on the conditional independence.
Lemma 5. Under an oblivious adversary, for each ℓ = 1, 2, · · · , L, the level-ℓ observations (mt)t∈Φℓ(T )
are independent of the level-ℓ bids (bt)t∈Φℓ(T ). Consequently, the level-ℓ observations (mt)t∈Φℓ(T ) are
mutually independent conditioning on the level-ℓ bids (bt)t∈Φℓ(T ).
Proof. Fix any t ∈ Φℓ(T ). Since the time point t is classified as level ℓ, the bidder at time t exploits
in the first ℓ− 1 levels and explores in the last level. Hence, the bid bt is determined by the widths
wℓi,t for all i ∈ Bℓ−1t , which in turn depends on nℓi,t in (21), the previous estimates p̂ℓ−1i,t , r̂ℓ−1i,t in (23),
(24), and the previous candidate set Bℓ−1t in (25). Continuing the above process until ℓ = 0 shows
that bt only depends on the quantities (bs : s < t, s ∈ ∪ℓℓ′=0Φℓ
′
(T )), (ms : s < t, s ∈ ∪ℓ−1ℓ′=0Φℓ
′
(T ))
and vt. If we further expand the dependence of the previous bids bs explicitly, we conclude that bt is
entirely determined by (ms : s < t, s ∈ ∪ℓ−1ℓ′=0Φℓ
′
(T )) and (vs : s ≤ t, s ∈ ∪ℓℓ′=0Φℓ
′
(T )). Consequently,
the collection of level-ℓ bids depends solely on (mt : t ∈ ∪ℓ−1ℓ′=0Φℓ
′
(T )) and (vt : t ∈ ∪ℓℓ′=0Φℓ
′
(T )),
which by the i.i.d. assumption of (mt)t∈[T ] and the definition of an oblivious adversary yields to the
claimed independence.
Based on Lemma 5, the following empirical probability
p̂ℓi,t =
∑
s∈Φℓ(t−1) 1(bs ≤ bi)1(bi < ms ≤ bi+1)∑
s∈Φℓ(t−1) 1(bs ≤ bi)
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in (23) becomes a normalized Binomial random variable if we condition on all (bs : s ∈ Φℓ(t− 1)),
with sample size nℓi,t and success probability pi , P(m1 ∈ (bi, bi+1]) = G(bi+1)−G(bi). As a result,
the following concentration inequality holds for all reward estimates r̂ℓi,t.
Lemma 6. Let ri,t = R(b
i, vt) be the expected reward of bidding b
i ∈ B at time t, and r̂ℓi,t be the
level-ℓ estimate of ri,t constructed in (24). For γ ≥ 3, with probability at least 1−4T−3, the following
inequality holds simultaneously for all i ∈ [K], ℓ ∈ [L], and T0 < t ≤ T :
∣∣∣r̂ℓi,t − ri,t∣∣∣ ≤ wℓi,t = γ
√√√√log(LKT )∑
j≥i
p̂ℓ−1j,t
nℓj,t
+ log(LKT )
(
1
nℓi,t
+
5√
T
) (26)
≤ γ
√log(LKT )∑
j≥i
pj
nℓj,t
+ log(LKT )
(
1
nℓi,t
+
7√
T
) . (27)
The proof of Lemma 6 requires a careful application of the Bernstein inequality to the estimation
of both the true rewards ri,t and the true variance
∑
j≥i pj/n
ℓ
j,t, which is relegated to the Appendix.
Specifically, Lemma 6 shows that the widths constructed in (22), albeit independent of the level-ℓ
observations, are reliable certificates of the future reward estimates using the level-ℓ observations.
The following Lemma 7 summarizes some desirable consequences of Lemma 6.
Lemma 7. Assume that the inequalities of Lemma 6 hold uniformly. Then for each time t > T0, let
i⋆(t) = argmaxi∈[K] ri,t be the index of the optimal bid in the set B, and ℓ ∈ [L] be the resulting level
of t. Then i⋆(t) is never eliminated from the candidate action set at time t, and the instantaneous
regret of time t is at most 8 · 2−ℓ.
Proof. We first show that the optimal action i⋆(t) is never eliminated. In fact, since the bidder
always exploits before level ℓ, the certificates satisfy that wℓ
′
i,t ≤ 2−ℓ
′
for all 1 ≤ ℓ′ < ℓ and i ∈ Bℓ′−1t .
Hence, for each 1 ≤ ℓ′ < ℓ, Lemma 6 gives the following chain of inequalities:
r̂ℓ
′
i⋆(t),t + w
ℓ′
i⋆(t),t ≥ ri⋆(t),t ≥ max
i∈Bℓ′−1
t
ri,t ≥ max
i∈Bℓ′−1
t
(r̂ℓ
′
i,t − wℓ
′
i,t)
≥ max
i∈Bℓ′−1
t
(r̂ℓ
′
i,t + w
ℓ′
i,t)− 2 max
i∈Bℓ′−1
t
wℓ
′
i,t
≥ max
i∈Bℓ′−1
t
(r̂ℓ
′
i,t + w
ℓ′
i,t)− 2 · 2−ℓ
′
,
implying that i⋆(t) is not eliminated by the rule (25).
For the second statement, let i ∈ [K] be the action chosen by the bidder at time t. Since the
instantaneous regret is upper bounded by one, the statement is vacuous if ℓ = 1, and we may assume
that ℓ ≥ 2. As a result, the action i passes the test (25) at level ℓ− 1, implying that (note that we
have established the fact that i⋆(t) is not eliminated)
ri⋆(t),t − ri,t ≤ r̂ℓ−1i⋆(t),t − r̂ℓ−1i,t +wℓ−1i⋆(t),t + wℓ−1i,t
≤ (wℓ−1i,t − wℓ−1i⋆(t),t + 2 · 2−(ℓ−1)) + wℓ−1i⋆(t),t + wℓ−1i,t
≤ 2 · 2−(ℓ−1) + 2 · 2−(ℓ−1) = 8 · 2−ℓ,
which establishes the claimed regret bound.
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As Lemma 7 upper bounds each instantaneous regret in terms of the assigned level at each time,
it offers a useful tool to upper bound the total regret. Specifically, since the total regret during the
first T0 rounds is at most T0, a double counting argument for T0 < t ≤ T leads to
T∑
t=1
(
max
i∈[K]
ri,t − ri(t),t
)
≤ T0 + 8
L∑
ℓ=1
2−ℓ · |Φℓ(T ) ∩ {t : T0 < t ≤ T}| (28)
provided that the high probability event in Lemma 6 holds, and i(t) ∈ [K] is the action taken by the
policy at time t. Hence, to upper bound the total regret shown in (28), it remains to upper bound
the cardinality of Φℓ(T )∩ {t : T0 < t ≤ T}, especially for small ℓ. Intuitively, such an upper bound
is possible as an exploration always shrinks the widths of the confidence band, so the bidder cannot
explore too much at any given level. The following lemma makes the above heuristics formal.
Lemma 8. For each ℓ ∈ [L], the following inequality holds:
2−ℓ · |Φℓ(T ) ∩ {t : T0 < t ≤ T}| ≤ 10γ log(LKT )(1 + log T ) ·
√
T .
Proof. For any T0 < t ≤ T , the definition of t ∈ Φℓ(T ) implies that the width of the chosen action
is at least 2−ℓ, i.e. wℓi(t),t > 2
−ℓ. Hence,
2−ℓ · |Φℓ(T ) ∩ {t : T0 < t ≤ T}|
≤
∑
t>T0:t∈Φℓ(T )
wℓi(t),t
(a)
≤
∑
t>T0:t∈Φℓ(T )
γ
√log(LKT ) ∑
j≥i(t)
pj
nℓj,t
+ log(LKT )
(
1
nℓi(t),t
+
7√
T
)
(b)
≤ γ
√
|Φℓ(T )| log(LKT ) ·
√ ∑
t>T0:t∈Φℓ(T )
∑
j≥i(t)
pj
nℓj,t
+ γ log(LKT )
 ∑
t>T0:t∈Φℓ(T )
1
nℓi(t),t
+
7|Φℓ(T )|√
T

(c)
≤ γ
(√
log(LKT )(1 + log T ) ·
√
T + log(LKT )(1 + log T ) ·K + 7 log(LKT )
√
T
)
where (a) follows from (27) in Lemma 6, (b) is due to the Cauchy–Schwartz inequality, and (c) is
due to the following Lemma 9 and the simple fact that |Φℓ(T )| ≤ T . The rest of the proof follows
from simple algebra and the choice K = ⌈√T ⌉.
The following Lemma 9, which holds deterministically under any level decomposition and any
bidding sequence, is a key combinatorial lemma used in the proof of Lemma 8.
Lemma 9. Let nℓj,t be defined in (21), and (p1, · · · , pK) be any non-negative vector with
∑K
i=1 pi = 1.
Then for any ℓ ∈ [L] and any subset Φℓ(T ) ⊆ [T ], it holds that∑
t>T0:t∈Φℓ(T )
∑
j≥i(t)
pj
nℓj,t
≤ 1 + log T,
∑
t>T0:t∈Φℓ(T )
1
nℓi(t),t
≤ K(1 + log T ).
Remark 5. The presence of pj in the regret upper bound plays a key role in a small total sum of
the regret contributions from all intervals, highlighting the necessity of tight upper confidence bounds
during the interval splitting. Note that using the loose bound where pj’s are replaced by 1, the right-
hand side of the first inequality in Lemma 9 also becomes K(1+ log T ), which renders an O˜(
√
KT )
final regret instead of O˜(
√
T ).
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Finally, combining Lemma 8 and the inequality (28), the following upper bound on the total
regret holds provided that the high-probability events in Lemma 6 holds:
T∑
t=1
(
max
i∈[K]
ri,t − ri(t),t
)
≤ (L+ 1) · ⌈
√
T⌉+ 80γ log(LKT )(1 + log T ) · L
√
T .
Now taking into account the failure probability in Lemma 6, and following the same quantization
argument for the implication from Theorem 3 to Theorem 1, the desired upper bound of Theorem
5 follows from Lemma 1.
5 Acknowledgements
The authors would like to thank Tiancheng Yu for spotting an error in the proof of a concentration
inequality in an earlier version, which motivates the current Algorithm 4. The authors would also
like to thank Erik Ordentlich for many helpful discussions on the problem setup.
A Auxiliary Lemmas
Lemma 10. [dlPKL04, Corollary 2.2] If two random variables A,B satisfy E[exp(λA−λ2B2/2)] ≤
1 for any λ ∈ R, then for any x ≥ √2 and y > 0 we have
P
(
|A|
/√
(B2 + y)
(
1 +
1
2
log
(
1 +
B2
y
))
≥ x
)
≤ exp
(
−x
2
2
)
.
Lemma 11. Let P,Q be two probability measures on the same probability space. Then
1− ‖P −Q‖TV ≥ 1
2
exp
(
−DKL(P‖Q) +DKL(Q‖P )
2
)
.
Proof. The lemma follows from [Tsy08, Lemma 2.6] and the convexity of x 7→ exp(−x).
Lemma 12 (Bernstein inequality [BLM13]). Let X1, . . . ,Xn ∈ [a, b] be independent random vari-
ables with
σ2 ,
n∑
i=1
Var(Xi).
Then we have
P
(∣∣∣∣∣
n∑
i=1
Xi −
n∑
i=1
E[Xi]
∣∣∣∣∣ ≥ ε
)
≤ 2 exp
(
− ε
2
2(σ2 + (b− a)ε/3)
)
.
Lemma 13. Let A,B ≥ 0 and x2 ≤ Ax+B. Then x ≤ A+√B.
Proof. If x > A+
√
B, then
x2 −Ax−B = x(x−A)−B >
√
B ·
√
B −B = 0.
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B Proof of the Regret Lower Bound
This section is devoted to the proof of the following Ω(
√
T ) lower bound on the regret.
Theorem 6. Even in the special case where vt ≡ 1 and others’ bids mt are always revealed at the
end of each round, there exists an absolute constant c > 0 independent of T such that
inf
π
sup
G
EG[RT (π; v)] ≥ c
√
T ,
where the supremum is taken over all possible CDFs G(·) of the others’ bid mt, and the infimum is
taken over all possible policies π.
The proof of Theorem 6 is the usual manifestation of the Le Cam’s two-point method [Tsy08].
Consider the following two candidates of the CDFs supported on [0, 1]:
G1(x) =

0 if 0 ≤ x < 13
1
2 +∆ if
1
3 ≤ x < 23
1 if x ≥ 23
, G2(x) =

0 if 0 ≤ x < 13
1
2 −∆ if 13 ≤ x < 23
1 if x ≥ 23
,
where ∆ ∈ (0, 1/4) is some parameter to be chosen later. In other words, the CDF G1 corresponds
to a discrete random variable taking value in {1/3, 2/3} with probability (1/2 + ∆, 1/2 −∆), and
the CDF G2 corresponds to the probability (1/2−∆, 1/2 +∆). Let R1(vt, bt) and R2(vt, bt) be the
expected reward in (2) averaged under the CDF G1 and G2, respectively. After some algebra, it is
straightforward to check that
max
b∈[0,1]
R1(vt, b) = max
b∈[0,1]
(1− b)G1(b) = 1 + 2∆
3
,
max
b∈[0,1]
R2(vt, b) = max
b∈[0,1]
(1− b)G2(b) = 1
3
,
max
b∈[0,1]
(R1(vt, b) +R2(vt, b)) = max
b∈[0,1]
(1− b)(G1(b) +G2(b)) = 2
3
.
Hence, for any bt ∈ [0, 1], we have(
max
b∈[0,1]
R1(vt, b)−R1(vt, bt)
)
+
(
max
b∈[0,1]
R2(vt, b)−R2(vt, bt)
)
≥ max
b∈[0,1]
R1(vt, b) + max
b∈[0,1]
R2(vt, b)− max
b∈[0,1]
(R1(vt, b) +R2(vt, b))
=
2∆
3
. (29)
The inequality (29) is the separation condition required in the two-point method: there is no single
bid bt which gives a uniformly small instantaneous regret under both CDFs G1 and G2.
For i ∈ {1, 2}, let P ti be the distribution of all observables (m1, · · · ,mt−1) at the beginning of
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time t. Then for any policy π,
sup
G
EG[RT (π; v)]
(a)
≥ 1
2
EG1 [RT (π; v)] +
1
2
EG2 [RT (π; v)]
=
1
2
T∑
t=1
(
EP t1
[
max
b∈[0,1]
R1(vt, b)−R1(vt, bt)
]
+ EP t2
[
max
b∈[0,1]
R2(vt, b)−R2(vt, bt)
])
(b)
≥ 1
2
T∑
t=1
2∆
3
∫
min{dP t1 , dP t2}
(c)
=
1
2
T∑
t=1
2∆
3
(1− ‖P t1 − P t2‖TV)
(d)
≥ ∆T
3
(
1− ‖P T1 − P T2 ‖TV
)
, (30)
where (a) is due to the fact that the maximum is no smaller than the average, (b) follows from (29),
(c) is due to the identity
∫
min{dP, dQ} = 1 − ‖P − Q‖TV, and (d) is due to the data-processing
inequality ‖P t1 − P t2‖TV ≤ ‖P T1 − P T2 ‖TV for the total variation distance. Invoking Lemma 11 and
using the fact that for ∆ ∈ (0, 1/4),
DKL(P
T
1 ‖P T2 ) = (T − 1)DKL(G1‖G2)
= (T − 1)
((
1
2
−∆
)
log
1/2 −∆
1/2 + ∆
+
(
1
2
+ ∆
)
log
1/2 + ∆
1/2 −∆
)
≤ 32T∆2,
we have the following inequality on the total variation distance:
1− ‖P T1 − P T2 ‖TV ≥
1
2
exp
(−32T∆2) . (31)
Finally, choosing ∆ = 1/(4
√
T ) and combining (30), (31), we conclude that Theorem 6 holds with
the constant c = 1/(24e2).
C Proof of Main Lemmas
C.1 Proof of Lemma 1
By the definition of regret in a first-price auction, we have:
RT (π, v) =
T∑
t=1
(
max
b∈[0,1]
R(vt, b)−R(vt, bt)
)
=
T∑
t=1
(
max
b∈[0,1]
R(vt, b)−max
b∈A
R(v˜t, b) + max
b∈A
R(v˜t, b)−R(v˜t, bt) +R(v˜t, bt)−R(vt, bt)
)
= R˜T (π
Q, v) +
T∑
t=1
(R(v˜t, bt)−R(vt, bt)) +
T∑
t=1
(
max
b∈[0,1]
R(vt, b)−max
b∈A
R(v˜t, b)
)
≤ R˜T (πQ, v) + T
M
+
(
T
M
+
T
K
)
= R˜T (π
Q, v) +
2T
M
+
T
K
,
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where the inequality follows from
|R(v, b) −R(v˜, b)| = |v − v˜|G(b) ≤ |v − v˜| ≤ 1
M
, ∀v, b ∈ [0, 1],
and for any v ∈ [0, 1] with b˜ = min{b′ ∈ A : b′ ≥ b}, it holds that
max
b∈[0,1]
R(v, b) = max
0≤b≤v
R(v, b) ≤ max
0≤b≤v
(v − b)G(˜b) ≤ max
0≤b≤v
(v − b˜)G(˜b) + 1
K
≤ max
b∈A
R(v, b) +
1
K
.
C.2 Proof of Lemma 2
Fix any v1, v2 ∈ [0, 1] with v1 ≤ v2. Then for any b ≤ b⋆(v1), it holds that
R(v2, b) = R(v1, b) + (v2 − v1)G(b)
≤ R(v1, b⋆(v1)) + (v2 − v1)G(b⋆(v1))
= R(v2, b
⋆(v1)),
where the inequality follows from the definition of b⋆(v1) and the assumption b ≤ b⋆(v1). Hence, all
bids b ≤ b⋆(v1) cannot be the largest maximizer of R(v2, b), and b⋆(v1) ≤ b⋆(v2) as claimed.
C.3 Proof of Lemma 4
By definition, we have ntc,a =
∑t
s=1 1(as ≤ a), and
(ntc,a)
1
2 |r¯tc,a −Rc,a| =
∣∣∑t
s=1 1(as ≤ a)(rs,c,a −Rc,a)
∣∣√∑t
s=1 1(as ≤ a)
.
Hence, by a union bound, the first inequality P(G) ≥ 1− T−2 follows from the following pointwise
inequality: for fixed c ∈ C, a ∈ A, t ∈ [T ], it holds that
P
∣∣∑ts=1 1(as ≤ a)(rs,c,a −Rc,a)∣∣√∑t
s=1 1(as ≤ a)
> γ log(KMT )
 ≤ (KMT )−3. (32)
The main difficulty in proving (32) is that the choice of at may depend on the previous observations
{rs,c,a}s<t, and therefore the summands on the numerator are not mutually independent. However,
if we define Ft = σ({as, cs, (rs,c,a)c∈C,a∈A}s≤t) to be the σ-field of the historic observations up to
time t, then at is Ft−1-measurable and rt,c,a is independent of Ft−1, and consequently
Mt :=
t∑
s=1
1(as ≤ a)(rs,c,a −Rc,a)
is a martingale adapted to the filtration {Ft}t≥1. Further define the predictable quadratic variation
and the total quadratic variation of Mt respectively as
〈M〉t :=
t∑
s=1
E[(Ms −Ms−1)2|Fs−1], [M ]t :=
t∑
s=1
(Ms −Ms−1)2,
then the theory of self-normalized martingales [BT08, Lemma B.1] gives that E[exp(λMt−λ2(〈M〉t+
[M ]t)/2)] ≤ 1 holds for all λ ∈ R, i.e., the choices A = Mt and B2 = 〈M〉t + [M ]t fulfill the
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condition of Lemma 10. Thanks to the boundedness assumption rs,c,a ∈ [0, 1], simple algebra gives
〈M〉t + [M ]t ≤ 2
∑
s≤t 1(as ≤ a), and the choice y = 1 leads to
(B2 + y)
(
1 +
1
2
log
(
1 +
B2
y
))
≤ 3
t∑
s=1
1(as ≤ a) ·
(
1 +
1
2
log(1 + 2T )
)
≤ 3 log(KT ) ·
t∑
s=1
1(as ≤ a).
Hence, applying Lemma 10 with y = 1 yields an upper bound (KMT )−γ2/3 of the deviation
probability in (32), which is no larger than (KMT )−3 thanks to the assumption γ ≥ 3.
C.4 Proof of Lemma 3
Let F be the common CDF of the random variables X1, · · · ,XT . Conditioning on Xt, the sum∑
2≤s≤t−1 1(Xs ≤ Xt) follows a Binomial distribution B(t− 2, F (Xt)), then using
E
[
1
1 + B(n, p)
]
=
n∑
k=0
1
1 + k
(
n
k
)
pk(1− p)n−k
=
n∑
k=0
1
(n+ 1)p
(
n+ 1
k + 1
)
pk+1(1− p)n−k
=
1
(n+ 1)p
(
1− (1− p)n+1)
≤ min
{
1
(n+ 1)p
, 1
}
gives
E
1 + ∑
2≤s≤t−1
1(Xs ≤ Xt)
−1 ≤ E [min{ 1
(t− 1)F (Xt) , 1
}]
.
Since P(F (Xt) ≤ x) ≤ x for any x ∈ [0, 1], the random variable F (Xt) stochastically dominates
U ∼ Unif([0, 1]). Applying the stochastic dominance result to the decreasing function x ∈ [0, 1] 7→
min{1/((t − 1)x), 1} yields
E
[
min
{
1
(t− 1)F (Xt) , 1
}]
≤ E
[
min
{
1
(t− 1)U , 1
}]
=
1 + log(t− 1)
t− 1 .
Now the proof is completed by
T∑
t=2
1 + log(t− 1)
t− 1 ≤ (1 + log T ) ·
T−1∑
t=1
1
t
≤ (1 + log T )2.
C.5 Proof of Lemma 6
We first prove the following inequality: for each i ∈ [K], ℓ ∈ [L], T0 < t ≤ T and γ ≥ 3,
P
∣∣∣r̂ℓi,t − ri,t∣∣∣ ≥ γ
√log(LKT )∑
j≥i
pj
nℓj,t
+
log(LKT )
nℓi,t
 ≤ 2
(LKT )4
. (33)
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In fact, by the definition of r̂ℓi,t in (24), we have∣∣∣r̂ℓi,t − ri,t∣∣∣ = |vt − bi| ·
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
j≥i
∑
s∈Φℓ(t−1) 1(bs ≤ bj)(1(bj < ms ≤ bj+1)− pj)∑
s∈Φℓ(t−1) 1(bs ≤ bj)
∣∣∣∣∣∣
≤
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
j≥i
∑
s∈Φℓ(t−1) 1(bs ≤ bj)(1(bj < ms ≤ bj+1)− pj)∑
s∈Φℓ(t−1) 1(bs ≤ bj)
∣∣∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
s∈Φℓ(t−1)
∑
j≥i
1(bs ≤ bj)
nℓj,t
(1(bj < ms ≤ bj+1)− pj)
∣∣∣∣∣∣ .
Now conditioning on the variables (bs : s ∈ Φℓ(t− 1)), the only random variables appearing in the
target inequality (33) are (ms : s ∈ Φℓ(t − 1)), which by Lemma 5 are still mutually independent.
We will show that (33) holds even after conditioning on (bs : s ∈ Φℓ(t − 1)), and therefore the
unconditional version holds as well. Hence, in the sequel we assume that the conditioning is always
performed.
For s ∈ Φℓ(t− 1), define a random variable
Xs ,
∑
j≥i
1(bs ≤ bj)
nℓj,t
(1(bj < ms ≤ bj+1)− pj). (34)
Clearly E[Xs] = 0. Moreover, as the map j 7→ nℓj,t =
∑
s∈Φℓ(t−1) 1(bs ≤ bj) is always non-decreasing,
the range of each Xs, i.e. the difference of the largest and smallest possible values of Xs, is at most
1/nℓi,t. Furthermore,
E[X2s ] =
∑
j≥i
1(bs ≤ bj)
(nℓj,t)
2
· E[(1(bj < ms ≤ bj+1)− pj)2]
+
∑
j≥i,j′≥i,j 6=j′
1(bs ≤ bj)
nℓj,t
1(bs ≤ bj′)
nℓj′,t
· E[(1(bj < ms ≤ bj+1)− pj)(1(bj′ < ms ≤ bj′+1)− pj′)]
=
∑
j≥i
1(bs ≤ bj)
(nℓj,t)
2
· pj(1− pj)−
∑
j≥i,j′≥i,j 6=j′
1(bs ≤ bj)
nℓj,t
1(bs ≤ bj′)
nℓj′,t
· pjpj′
≤
∑
j≥i
1(bs ≤ bj)
(nℓj,t)
2
pj. (35)
As the random variables (Xs : s ∈ Φℓ(t− 1)) are mutually independent after the conditioning, the
individual variance in (35) leads to
Var
 ∑
s∈Φℓ(t−1)
Xs
 = ∑
s∈Φℓ(t−1)
E[X2s ] ≤
∑
s∈Φℓ(t−1)
∑
j≥i
1(bs ≤ bj)
(nℓj,t)
2
pj =
∑
j≥i
pj
nℓj,t
. (36)
Hence, by the Bernstein inequality (cf. Lemma 12) applied to the variance upper bound in (36) and
the range upper bound of each Xs, we conclude that
P
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
s∈Φℓ(t−1)
Xs
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≥ γ
√log(LKT )∑
j≥i
pj
nℓj,t
+
log(LKT )
nℓi,t
 ≤ 2(LKT )−min{γ2,3γ}/2.
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Choosing γ ≥ 3 completes the proof of the target inequality (33).
Now we use (33) to prove Lemma 6. First note that by a union bound over i ∈ [K], ℓ ∈ [L] and
T0 ≤ t ≤ T , the following inequality holds uniformly over all (i, ℓ, t) tuples with probability at least
1− 2T−3:
∣∣∣r̂ℓi,t − ri,t∣∣∣ ≤ γ
√log(LKT )∑
j≥i
pj
nℓj,t
+
log(LKT )
nℓi,t
 . (37)
Second, by an entirely similar argument, we may also show that with probability at least 1− 2T−3,
another inequality holds uniformly over (i, ℓ, t):∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
j≥i
p̂ℓ−1j,t − pj
nℓj,t
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ 3
√log(LKT )∑
j≥i
pj
(nℓj,t)
2nℓ−1j,t
+
log(LKT )
nℓi,tn
ℓ−1
i,t
 . (38)
Recall that thanks to the initialization of Algorithm 4 at t ≤ T0, it always holds that nℓj,t, nℓ−1j,t ≥
√
T
for all j ∈ [K] and t ≥ T0. Consequently, the inequality (38) can be further upper bounded as∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
j≥i
p̂ℓ−1j,t
nℓj,t
−
∑
j≥i
pj
nℓj,t
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ 3
√
log(LKT )
T
·
√∑
j≥i
pj
nℓj,t
+
3 log(LKT )
T
. (39)
Let
V =
∑
j≥i
pj
nℓj,t
, V̂ =
∑
j≥i
p̂ℓ−1j,t
nℓj,t
,
then (39) implies that V ≤ 3
√
log(LKT )/T · √V + 3 log(LKT )/T + V̂ . Hence, by Lemma 13, we
have
√
V ≤ 3
√
log(LKT )
T
+
√
3 log(LKT )
T
+ V̂ ≤ 5
√
log(LKT )
T
+
√
V̂ ,
which together with (37) gives the first inequality (26) of Lemma 6. For the second inequality (27),
note that (39) also gives
V̂ ≤ V + 3
√
log(LKT )
T
·
√
V +
3 log(LKT )
T
≤
(√
V + 2
√
log(LKT )
T
)2
,
and therefore
√
V̂ ≤ √V +2
√
log(LKT )/T . Now plugging the above inequality into (37) gives the
second inequality (27).
C.6 Proof of Lemma 9
Recall from (21) and the initialization before t ≤ T0 that
nℓj,t =
∑
s∈Φℓ(T ),s<t
1(bs ≤ bj) = ⌈
√
T ⌉+
∑
s∈Φℓ(T ),T0<s<t
1(bs ≤ bj).
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Also, as bt = b
i(t), the condition j ≥ i(t) is equivalent to bt ≤ bj. Hence,
∑
t>T0:t∈Φℓ(T )
∑
j≥i(t)
pj
nℓj,t
=
K∑
j=1
pj
∑
t>T0:t∈Φℓ(T )
1(j ≥ i(t))
nℓj,t
=
K∑
j=1
pj
∑
t>T0:t∈Φℓ(T )
1(bt ≤ bj)
nℓj,t
=
K∑
j=1
pj
∑
t>T0:t∈Φℓ(T )
1(bt ≤ bj)
⌈√T ⌉+∑s∈Φℓ(T ),T0<s<t 1(bs ≤ bj)
≤
K∑
j=1
pj
(
1
⌈√T ⌉ +
1
⌈√T ⌉+ 1 + · · ·+
1
T
)
≤
K∑
j=1
pj(1 + log T ) = 1 + log T,
completing the proof of the first inequality. For the other inequality, we have
∑
t>T0:t∈Φℓ(T )
1
nℓi(t),t
=
∑
t>T0:t∈Φℓ(T )
K∑
j=1
1(bt = b
j)
nℓi(t),t
=
∑
t>T0:t∈Φℓ(T )
K∑
j=1
1(bt = b
j)
⌈√T ⌉+∑s∈Φℓ(T ),T0<s<t 1(bs = bj)
=
K∑
j=1
∑
t>T0:t∈Φℓ(T )
1(bt = b
j)
⌈√T ⌉+∑s∈Φℓ(T ),T0<s<t 1(bs = bj)
≤
K∑
j=1
(
1
⌈√T ⌉ +
1
⌈√T ⌉+ 1 + · · ·+
1
T
)
≤ K(1 + log T ).
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